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INTRODUCTION
Two types of discriminatory-effect claims have been recognized
under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)1: (1) disparate impact; and
(2) segregative effect. Neither requires a showing of illegal intent, and
both, according to a 2013 regulation promulgated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),2 are subject to the
same three-step burden-shifting proof scheme, which assigns the
plaintiff the initial burden of proving that the defendant’s challenged
practice causes a discriminatory effect.3 Both the disparate-impact and
segregative-effect theories date back to appellate decisions from the
1970s,4 although the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the former in
2015 in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclu1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968). The FHA, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2015).
2. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (promulgating 24 C.F.R. § 100.500). As
the agency primarily responsible for administering the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a),
HUD’s regulations interpreting the FHA are entitled to substantial deference, see
Meyers v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003).
3. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017). For a description of this three-step process,
see infra Section I.A.
4. See Metro. Hous. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1288–94 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85
(8th Cir. 1974). The Arlington Heights and Black Jack cases are discussed in detail
infra Section I.C.1.
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sive Communities Project, Inc. 5 means that disparate impact has received more attention lately.
Last year, in an article co-authored with Calvin Bradford,6 I addressed disparate-impact claims. This Article examines the FHA’s
segregative-effect theory, which is far more elusive, in part because it,
unlike the disparate-impact theory, has no clear analog in Title VII
claims challenging employment discrimination.7 The goal of this Article is to provide guidance for evaluating segregative-effect claims,
particularly in the crucial first step or “prima facie case” stage.8
Part I of this Article reviews the law governing segregative-effect
claims as set forth in HUD’s 2013 regulation—and in cases decided
both before and after that regulation—noting how the elements of
such a claim differ from that of disparate-impact claims. Part II explores situations in which the segregative-effect theory may make a
unique contribution, apart from impact claims, in the FHA’s coverage.
These include the classic example—exclusionary zoning, which Inclusive Communities labeled “heartland” cases—and other likely scenarios, including those based on prohibited forms of discrimination other
than race and national origin. The Article concludes that the segregative-effect theory holds great promise for advancing the FHA’s goal of
reducing arbitrary barriers to minorities’ housing choices, but it needs
more refinement before that promise can be fulfilled.

5. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
6. See Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair
Housing Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 685
(2016).
7. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522–24 (2015) (tying the proper analysis of disparate-impact claims
under the FHA to their counterpart under the federal employment discrimination law,
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2015).
8. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523. The Inclusive Communities opinion
directed courts to “examine with care” FHA plaintiffs’ proof of discriminatory effect,
with an eye toward facilitating the “prompt resolution” (i.e., early dismissal) of nonmeritorious claims. Id. Heeding this directive, a number of lower courts after Inclusive Communities have issued pre-trial rulings against FHA-effect claims. See, e.g.,
Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 689 n.10 (collecting cases); see also infra
note 273 and accompanying text.
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I.
PROVING SEGREGATIVE EFFECT
IN FHA CASES

A. Basic Framework of a FHA Segregative-Effect Claim:
The Three Steps
HUD’s 2013 regulation establishes the standards that govern discriminatory-effect claims under the FHA.9 This regulation sets forth
the basic three-step burden-shifting framework applicable to all such
claims, regardless of whether they are based on the disparate-impact
or segregative-effect theory.10
Under the 2013 regulation, all discriminatory-effect cases are to
be analyzed in three steps.11 In “Step One,” the plaintiff has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case by proving that “a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”12 In “Step Two,” if the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its “challenged practice is
necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”13 If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff
may still prevail in “Step Three” by proving that the defendant’s interest in “the challenged practice could be served by another practice that
has a less discriminatory effect.”14
This Article focuses on Step One in proving segregative-effect
claims.15 This requires three elements: (1) identifying a particular
practice of the defendant to challenge; (2) showing through statistical
evidence that this practice exacerbates segregation in the relevant
9. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
10. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2017). For disparate-impact claims, the standards
set forth in the HUD regulation are virtually identical to those adopted by the Supreme
Court in the Inclusive Communities decision. Compare Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,470 (Feb.
15, 2013) (HUD), with Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23. Because Inclusive
Communities dealt only with disparate-impact claims, segregative-effect claims are
governed solely by the HUD regulation.
11. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c).
12. Id. § 100.500(c)(1); cf. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (adopting the same
view for disparate-impact claims).
13. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2); cf. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (adopting
similar language—“necessary to achieve a valid interest”—to describe this second
step in disparate-impact claims).
14. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3); cf. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2515 (adopting
the same view for disparate-impact claims); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of
Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that prior Second Circuit precedent putting the burden of proof in this step on the defendant must be abrogated in
light of the HUD regulation’s determination to put this burden on the plaintiff).
15. For more on Steps Two and Three, see infra Section II.B.6.
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community to a sufficiently large degree; and (3) proving that the defendant’s challenged practice actually caused this segregative effect.16
The principles underlying the segregative-effect theory as established
in case law before and after the HUD regulation are explored in the
rest of Part I. Part II deals with the application of these principles to a
variety of situations.
B.

Distinguishing Disparate-Impact from
Segregative-Effect Claims

HUD’s regulation endorsing discriminatory-effect claims under
the FHA recognizes that a challenged practice may have an illegal
effect in either of two ways: “(1) harm to a particular group of persons
by a disparate impact; and (2) harm to the community generally by
creating, increasing, reinforcing, or perpetuating segregated housing
patterns.”17 These two theories had been recognized by numerous
courts,18 which, along with HUD, agreed that a FHA plaintiff may
present evidence supporting both types of discriminatory-effect claims
in a single case.19
Most segregative-effect claims have been made against municipalities accused of using their land-use powers to block integrated
housing developments in predominantly white areas.20 Unlike disparate-impact claims, segregative-effect claims may challenge a particular action or decision of the defendant as well as an across-the-board
policy.21 Moreover, segregative-effect claims focus on the harm done
to the local community, whereas disparate-impact claims focus on the
harm done to a racial minority or other FHA-protected class.22 Statisti16. See infra Section II.A.2.a; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,468–69 (Feb. 15, 2013)
(HUD regulation); Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523–24.
17. Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469 (describing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)).
This regulation provides that “[a] practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually
or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases,
reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a).
18. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 10:7 n.1 (2017) (collecting cases).
19. See, e.g., id. at § 10:5 n.3, para. 1 (collecting cases); infra note 27 (discussing
additional cases).
20. See infra Section I.C.1–.2; see also Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469
(noting that “the perpetuation of segregation theory of liability has been utilized by
private developers and others to challenge practices that frustrated affordable housing
development in nearly all-white communities and thus has aided attempts to promote
integration [citing cases]”).
21. See infra Section II.A.1.
22. See Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469.
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cal evidence is the key to proving both types of claims, but the focus
of this evidence differs: disparate-impact claims require a comparison
of how a challenged policy affects different groups, while segregativeeffect claims focus on how a challenged action affects residential segregation in the area.23
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Communities
endorsed FHA disparate-impact claims, but did not deal with—indeed, barely mentioned—the segregative-effect theory.24 Furthermore,
unlike disparate-impact, the segregative-effect theory has no clear analog in Title VII law.25 This is not to say that segregative-effect claims
are on shaky ground. To the contrary, based on the HUD regulation
and Inclusive Communities’ recognition that the FHA is designed to
foster integration,26 such claims have a strong foundation.27 This Article focuses on how the FHA’s segregative-effect theory might apply
in various situations and what proof would be required in such cases.28

23. See infra Section II.A.2.a; see also SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 10:5 n.3,
para. 1 (collecting cases).
24. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2516–25 (2015) (dealing only with the question of whether disparateimpact claims are cognizable under the FHA); id. at 2522 (noting that while the FHA
does not “force housing authorities to reorder their priorities,” it does aim “to ensure
that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects
or perpetuating segregation”); id. at 2525 (noting that some “communities [ ] have
long suffered the harsh consequences of segregated housing patterns” and that “local
housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with
race-neutral tools”). For more on Inclusive Communities and the segregative-effect
theory, see infra Section I.C.3.a.
25. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–18 (describing Title VII’s effect standard only in terms of disparate-impact claims); see also Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263,
273–78 (2004) (describing the undeveloped state of Title VII law regarding hiring
programs designed to create a diverse work force).
26. See 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22, 2525–26 (recognizing the FHA’s goal of integration); see also id. at 2519, 2522 (citing with approval a prominent segregative-effect
precedent, Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38
(2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam)).
27. For an appellate decision after Inclusive Communities that recognized a segregative-effect claim along with a disparate-impact claim in a FHA-based challenge to a
municipality’s blocking of a proposed integrated housing development, see Anderson
Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d. 34, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2015), which is
discussed infra Section I.C.3.b. See also Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F. App’x 42 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (discussed infra Section I.C.3.b).
28. See infra Part II.
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C. Segregative-Effect Cases Before and After
HUD’s 2013 Regulation
The factual setting in most segregative-effect cases has basically
been the same: A zoning decision or other governmental action is
challenged for preventing the development of a housing project that
would help integrate a predominantly white area.
1. Foundation Cases: Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and
Huntington
The FHA was passed in 1968, and early Supreme Court and
lower-court decisions quickly declared that the statute should be interpreted broadly to achieve its goal of racial integration.29 At the same
time, developers of subsidized housing projects blocked by suburban
municipalities brought a number of suits alleging racial discrimination
in violation of the FHA, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other laws.30
These exclusionary zoning cases eventually produced three major appellate decisions that endorsed the segregative-effect theory of liability under the FHA.

29. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting
Senator Mondale, the FHA’s principal sponsor, as saying that the law was designed to
replace the ghettos “by truly integrated and balanced living patterns”); Otero v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the FHA’s
principal purpose was to promote “open, integrated residential housing patterns and to
prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat”); Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821–22 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the national housing policy [as expressed in the FHA]. . . . [D]esegregation
of housing is [a] goal of the national housing policy.”). For more on these cases, see
infra notes 188–192 and accompanying text (Trafficante), notes 319–323 and accompanying text (Otero), and note 188 (Shannon).
30. Besides the three cases discussed in this section, several other cases involving
similar fact patterns were decided in the early 1970s, but they did not rely on the
FHA’s segregative–effect theory. See United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc.
v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 809–11 (5th Cir. 1974) (ruling that the defendant-city engaged in racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
in refusing to allow a proposed subsidized housing project in a white area to tie into
its water and sewer systems); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming
district court’s ruling that the defendant-county engaged in racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause by blocking subsidized housing projects in
white areas surrounding Atlanta); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming ruling against defendant-city that blocked a
subsidized housing project in a white area based on proof of defendants’ racial motivation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the FHA); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (same, based only on the Fourteenth
Amendment).

716

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20:709

The first was United States v. City of Black Jack,31 where the
Eighth Circuit in 1974 held that the defendant-city, a suburb of St.
Louis, violated the FHA by enacting an ordinance barring new multifamily construction, which blocked a proposed 108-townhouse development known as Park View Heights that was intended for low- and
moderate-income households.32 Black Jack was virtually all white,
whereas St. Louis’s population was 40.9% black, and the city’s minority residents disproportionately lived in segregated neighborhoods and
often in overcrowded or substandard housing.33 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the FHA curbs the “discretion of local zoning officials
. . . where ‘the clear result of such discretion is the segregation of lowincome Blacks from all White neighborhoods.’ ”34
The Black Jack opinion began its analysis by holding that the
FHA, like Title VII, does not require a showing of racial purpose.35
Rather, because “[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone,” a
FHA plaintiff need only prove that the defendant’s conduct “actually
or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it
has a discriminatory effect.”36 Further, such an effect was not limited
31. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 1182–83. Park View Heights had received HUD approval in 1970 for
federal funding under § 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1
(1968), after which Black Jack incorporated the area and passed the ordinance barring
further multi-family development. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1182–83. The developer
and others brought a separate suit, alleging that the city’s action had the purpose and
effect of illegal discrimination in violation of the FHA and other federal laws. See
Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (reversing dismissal of this case on standing and ripeness grounds); see also Park View
Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979) (ordering additional remedial relief).
33. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183.
34. Id. at 1184 (quoting Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (N.D. Ohio 1972),
aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (unpublished table
decision)).
35. Id. at 1184–85 (applying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII three
years earlier in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). This view of the
FHA was later endorsed by many other appellate courts and eventually by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). See supra notes 4–5 and
accompanying text.
In Black Jack, the United States as plaintiff also contended that the challenged
ordinance “was enacted for the purpose of excluding blacks,” pointing out that local
citizens’ opposition to the proposed development “was repeatedly expressed in racial
terms.” 508 F.2d at 1185 n.3. The Eighth Circuit, though noting that race did seem to
play a significant role in the opposition, chose not to “base our conclusion that the
Black Jack ordinance violates [the FHA] on a finding that there was an improper
purpose.” Id.
36. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–85.
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to actions that harmed blacks more than whites.37 According to Black
Jack, the alleged discriminatory effect must be assessed in light of the
segregated housing patterns in the relevant metropolitan area:
Black Jack’s action is but one more factor confining blacks to lowincome housing in the center city, confirming the inexorable process whereby the St. Louis metropolitan area becomes one that “has
the racial shape of a donut, with the Negroes in the hole and with
mostly Whites occupying the ring.” . . . Park View Heights was
particularly designed to contribute to the prevention of this prospect
so antithetical to the Fair Housing Act. . . . There was ample proof
that many blacks would live in the development, and that the exclusion of the townhouses would contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community which was 99 percent white.38

Having determined that Black Jack’s ordinance had this type of discriminatory effect, the Eighth Circuit ruled that, because the defendant’s justifications for it were inadequate,39 the ordinance violated
the FHA and should be enjoined.40
37. The district court concluded that Black Jack’s ordinance had no measurably
greater impact on blacks than whites, because the class of people for whom the proposed development was designed (i.e., families in a specified income range) included
thirty-two percent of the blacks and twenty-nine percent of whites in the metropolitan
area. This conclusion was error, the Eighth Circuit ruled, because it did not take into
account “the ‘ultimate effect’ or the ‘historical context’ of the City’s action.” Id. at
1186.
38. Id. at 1186 (quoting Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 355 F. Supp.
1257, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1973), rev’d, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974)).
39. Id. at 1186–88. Black Jack’s failed justifications included traffic problems,
school overcrowding, the devaluation of adjoining single-family homes, and “[t]he
assertion that there was no ‘market’ or ‘need’ for Park View Heights in the Black Jack
area.” Id. at 1188. The Eighth Circuit held that the defendant’s burden of justification
was to prove that its ordinance furthered “a compelling governmental interest,” id. at
1186, a standard derived from equal protection cases, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984), and one since replaced for FHA purposes by HUD’s 2013
discriminatory-effect regulation and the Supreme Court’s Inclusive Communities decision, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188. In a later case that involved similar allegations
against another St. Louis suburb that had blocked a proposed subsidized apartment
complex, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s decision that rejected both disparate-impact and segregative-effect claims. In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Mo.
1984), aff’d sub nom. Malone v. City of Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). In this case, the defendant-suburb (Fenton) had an all-white
population of 2400, and the plaintiffs’ fifteen units of subsidized housing would likely
include ten to fifteen black persons. Id. at 1147, 1152, 1167. The segregative-effect
claim failed, according to the district court, because the evidence did not establish that
“a significant number of blacks would move into [plaintiffs’ complex] if it were
built.” Id. at 1167. Thus, the impact this project “might have on segregated housing
patterns is insignificant and such a de minimus [sic] impact is not sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the Fair Housing.” Id. Fenton’s exclusion of this pro-
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Three years later in 1977, the Seventh Circuit produced the second major appellate decision involving the FHA’s segregative-effect
theory in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,41 a case with many similarities to Black Jack. The
proposed development in Arlington Heights, known as Lincoln Green,
would have created 190 townhouse apartments in a white suburb of
Chicago.42 Lincoln Green was to be subsidized under the same federal
program used in Black Jack,43 which meant that its residents would
have limited incomes and thus comprised a group in the metropolitan
area that was forty percent minority.44 The land chosen for Lincoln
Green was zoned for single-family dwellings, which the Village refused to change. The developer and three prospective residents sued,
alleging racial discrimination in violation of the FHA and the Equal
Protection Clause. Focusing on the latter claim, the district court ruled
for the defendant, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
discriminatory effect of the Village’s decision could violate the Constitution.45 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that discriminatory
purpose was required for an Equal Protection violation46 and that the
plaintiffs, while perhaps having proved a discriminatory effect, had
failed to show the necessary unlawful purpose.47 On remand, the Sevject, therefore, “would not contribute to the perpetuation of segregated housing in the
St. Louis area, in southwestern St. Louis County or in the City of Fenton.” Id.
41. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 1286. In 1970, Arlington Heights had a population of 64,884 people, of
whom twenty-seven were black. Id. at 1286–87. The Village claimed that the black
population had grown to two hundred by 1976, but the Seventh Circuit still determined that “Arlington Heights would be approximately ninety-nine percent white. We
find these numbers to be evidence of ‘overwhelming’ racial segregation.” Id. at 1291
n.9.
43. Id. at 1286 (referring to the § 236 subsidy program); see supra note 32 (describing Black Jack).
44. 558 F.2d at 1291.
45. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1975), rev’g 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
46. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65
(1977) (following, with respect to the need to prove purposeful discrimination for a
constitutional violation, the Court’s decision one year earlier in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
47. Id. at 269–71. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he impact of the Village’s decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities [because minorities] constitute 18% of the Chicago area population, and 40% of the income groups said to be
eligible for Lincoln Green,” id. at 269, but the other factors identified by the Court as
potential indicators of discriminatory intent favored the Village, id. at 269–70.
The Court’s identification of impact evidence as an element of proof of intent has
been of enduring importance, regularly followed by courts seeking to determine if an
illegal purpose motivated a defendant’s action. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at
§ 13:12 n.17 (collecting cases). This makes proof of disparate impact relevant in intent as well as impact cases. Would the same be true for proof that a defendant’s
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enth Circuit ruled that the defendant’s action did violate the FHA
based on a discriminatory-effect theory, at least if no other site in the
Village was available for the proposed development.48
According to the Seventh Circuit in its second Arlington Heights
decision, the FHA could be violated by either of two types of discriminatory effect: (1) an action that “had a greater impact on black people
than on white people”; or (2) an action that “had the effect of perpetuating segregation in Arlington Heights.”49 The Seventh Circuit viewed
the plaintiffs’ showing of disparate impact to be “relatively weak,”
because the class of people eligible for the proposed development—
and thus harmed by the Village’s action—was sixty percent white.50
The perpetuation-of-segregation effect, however, was seen as strong,
because “[t]he Village remains overwhelmingly white at the present
time, and the construction of Lincoln Green would be a significant
step toward integrating the community.”51 This was sufficient for the
plaintiffs to prevail, according to the Seventh Circuit, even though
other factors might favor the Village, because “we must decide close
cases in favor of integrated housing.”52 However, the segregative efaction has a segregative effect? No clear answer exists: Only a few decisions have
opined on this issue, and they have reached different conclusions. Compare Winfield
v. City of New York, No. 15CV5236-LTS-DCF, 2016 WL 6208564, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 24, 2016) (upholding intent claim based in part on allegations that defendant’s
policies preserved racial and ethnic segregation), with Bonasera v. City of Norcross,
342 F. App’x 581, 585–86 (11th Cir. 2009) (implying the contrary by considering
only impact evidence as a factor relevant to proving intent in an opinion recognizing
that the FHA can be violated by either segregative effect or disparate impact); In re
Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1160, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Malone v.
City of Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (same).
48. 558 F.2d at 1290. Shortly after this decision, the Third Circuit relied on it in
holding that effect alone could establish a prima facie case under the FHA and that the
plaintiffs’ evidence showed that the defendants’ actions had both a disparate impact
on blacks and resulted in segregating a Philadelphia neighborhood. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147–49 (3d Cir. 1977).
49. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288.
50. Id. at 1291.
51. Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1288 (making the same point); Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d, 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975)
(noting, in determining that Arlington Heights’s “rejection of Lincoln Green has the
effect of perpetuating . . . residential segregation,” that “[t]hough the building of this
project might have only minimal effects in terms of alleviating the segregative housing problem for the entire Chicago area, it might well result in increasing Arlington
Heights’ minority population over one thousand percent”).
52. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1294. The multi-factor approach to FHA discriminatory-effect cases adopted by the Seventh Circuit here, see id. at 1290–93, was
somewhat at odds with the approach of other circuits and has since been replaced by
the three-step approach set forth in HUD’s 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation and
the Supreme Court’s Inclusive Communities decision, see supra text accompanying
notes 10–14.
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fect would be ameliorated if Lincoln Green could be built elsewhere in
the Village, and the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to determine
this fact.53
The third key appellate decision was issued by the Second Circuit
in 1988 in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.54
Huntington was a highly segregated New York suburb with 200,000
residents, ninety-five percent of whom were white, and the Town’s
minority population was concentrated in two areas.55 The Town’s zoning plan confined all new private multifamily construction to a largely
minority urban renewal area.56 A developer in 1980 proposed to build
a 162-unit subsidized project in a different area that was ninety-eight
percent white.57 When the Town refused to approve the necessary
zoning changes, the developer, the local branch of the NAACP, and
two residents of Huntington sued, alleging, inter alia, that the Town
violated the FHA by barring multifamily developments outside of the
53. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1294–95. On remand, the parties reached a settlement based on building Lincoln Green on another parcel, which was approved by
the district court. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F.
Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff’d, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. 844 F.2d 926, 937–41 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). While Huntington
was being litigated, two other cases that included similar claims were decided against
the plaintiffs. One involved a different New York suburb and was dealt with in the
state court system. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d
323, 334–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 511 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1987) (adopting the
Seventh Circuit’s Arlington Heights analysis of FHA-effect claims, but ruling against
the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant-town had “perpetuated intratown segregation
by restricting subsidized family housing to the predominately ‘black’ areas . . . [because] there were also significant numbers of blacks in other areas of the town”). The
other was Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986), in which the Sixth
Circuit, while recognizing the segregative-effect theory, id. at 575, rejected a FHAbased challenge to a city’s referendums that blocked two proposed public housing
projects. Noting “the strong policy considerations underlying referendums,” id., the
Arthur opinion ruled against the plaintiffs’ disparate-impact and segregative-effect
claims, concluding that the evidence supporting the former was “relatively weak,” id.
at 576, and that the latter failed because the individuals eligible for the two blocked
projects were offered comparable housing elsewhere and “eventually did receive . . .
public housing in predominantly white neighborhoods,” id. at 577.
55. 844 F.2d at 929, 931.
56. Id. at 929–31. Minorities made up fifty-two percent of the residents in the urban
renewal area. Id. at 930.
57. Id. at 930–31. The project was to receive assistance under Section 8, “a federal
program that provides subsidies for newly-constructed and substantially-rehabilitated
housing.” Id. at 928 n.2. The developer sought to foster racial integration with this
project, which had a goal of twenty-five percent minority occupants. Id. at 930–31.
Because “a disproportionately large number of minorities are on the waiting list for
subsidized housing and existing Section 8 certificates,” the Second Circuit concluded
that a “significant percentage of the tenants [at the project] would belong to minority
groups.” Id. at 937.
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urban renewal area and by refusing to rezone the specific site for the
proposed project.58
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of both claims. In reversing the
trial court, the appellate court focused only on what plaintiffs had to
prove for a discriminatory-effect violation of the FHA.59 As in Black
Jack and Arlington Heights, the Second Circuit noted that discriminatory effect could be established in either of two ways: (1) by showing
that the defendant’s action had a disparate impact on minorities; or (2)
by showing that that action perpetuated segregation in the community.60 The court of appeals held that disparate impact had been
shown.61 More importantly for present purposes, the Huntington opinion criticized the district court for failing even to consider the plaintiffs’ segregative-effect theory,62 noting that “recognizing this second
form of effect advances the principal purpose of [the FHA] to promote, ‘open integrated residential housing patterns.’ ”63 The Second
Circuit then held that Huntington’s restriction of low-income multifamily housing to a minority area and its refusal to allow the proposed
project in a white area significantly perpetuated segregation.64
The Second Circuit then ruled that, because the Town failed to
provide adequate justifications, it violated the FHA.65 For relief, the
58. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the Equal Protection Clause, other federal civil rights statutes, and certain state laws, but they ultimately abandoned all but
the FHA claims. See id. at 928 n.1. The trial court originally dismissed the case for
lack of standing, but the Second Circuit reversed that decision in 1982. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937 n.7 (declining to review the trial court’s findings
on intentional discrimination on the ground that such a showing is not necessary in
FHA cases).
60. Id. at 937.
61. Id. at 937–38. The district court had ruled against this claim because more
whites than blacks would qualify for the proposed project, but the appellate court
noted that this use of absolute numbers, as opposed to comparative percentages, was
inconsistent with traditional disparate-impact analysis. Id. at 938.
62. Id. at 937, 938 n.9.
63. Id. at 937 (quoting Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir.
1973)).
64. Id. at 937–38.
65. Id. at 939–42. The Second Circuit ruled that the defendant’s burden in a FHAeffect case was to present “bona fide and legitimate justifications for its action with no
less discriminatory alternative available.” Id. at 939. This standard differed somewhat
from that imposed by other appellate courts in such cases, see id. at 939–41, and has
since been replaced by HUD’s 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation, see supra notes
13–14 and accompanying text. See also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819
F.3d 581, 617–19 (2d Cir. 2016); infra note 127.
In Huntington, the Town attempted to justify its ordinance restricting multifamily projects to the urban renewal area on the ground that it would encourage investment in these areas, but the Second Circuit found this rationale to be inadequate. It
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court ordered the Town to eliminate its restriction on multifamily
housing outside of the urban renewal area and to rezone the project
site for the proposed development.66 The Town appealed. In a limited
per curiam order, the Supreme Court affirmed and did not vacate the
Second Circuit’s decision, thus leaving intact its segregative-effect
analysis.67
The Second Circuit decided Huntington in early 1988, a few
months before Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act.68
This law strengthened the FHA’s enforcement mechanisms in various
ways and added disability and families with children to the groups
protected against discrimination.69 However, Congress did not change
the statute’s key prohibitory language, a fact that the Supreme Court
would later consider important in deciding to uphold FHA disparateimpact claims. According to the Court’s opinion in Inclusive Communities, Congress “accepted and ratified the unanimous holdings” of the
courts of appeals in Huntington, Arlington Heights, Black Jack, and
cases from six other circuits that had endorsed the disparate-impact
theory of liability.70 Although Inclusive Communities focused on disheld that this restriction was more likely to cause developers to invest in other towns
rather than in Huntington’s urban renewal area and that tax incentives would have
been a more effective and less discriminatory means to the desired end. 844 F.2d at
939. With respect to its opposition to the particular site of the proposed project, the
Town offered a variety of justifications, including increased traffic and sewage
problems, but the Second Circuit found that none of these was adequately supported
by evidence. Id. at 939–40.
66. 844 F.2d at 941–42.
67. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per
curiam). The Court reviewed only that portion of the case dealing with the Town’s
restriction of multifamily housing to the urban renewal area and did not consider the
issue of the particular project site. Id. at 18. Also, because the Town conceded the
applicability of the disparate-impact test under the FHA for evaluating its zoning ordinance, the Court did not reach the question of whether that test was the appropriate
one. Id. Having narrowed the case to a single issue, the Court simply stated: “Without
endorsing the precise analysis of the Court of Appeals, we are satisfied on this record
that disparate impact was shown, and that the sole justification proffered to rebut the
prima facie case was inadequate.” Id. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment below. Id.
68. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
69. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 5:3.
70. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2519–20 (2015); see also id. at 2520 (noting that the 1988 Congress
“rejected a proposed amendment that would have eliminated disparate-impact liability
for certain zoning decisions” and citing to H.R. REP. NO. 100-711 89–93 (1988),
which had discussed the Huntington decision).
The appellate decisions cited in this part of Inclusive Communities included Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussed supra note 54); Smith
v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065–67 (4th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the segregative-effect theory in the course of affirming plaintiff’s judgment based on both in-
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parate impact, its view that the 1988 Congress’s acceptance of prior
consistent appellate decisions is helpful in interpreting the FHA suggests that the three cases discussed in this section are entitled to added
weight.
2.

Other Cases Before the HUD Regulation

In addition to the appellate decisions in Huntington, Arlington
Heights, and Black Jack, HUD’s commentary on its 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation cited two district court decisions that had supported the segregative-effect theory of liability.71 The first was the
1997 decision in Summerchase Limited Partnership I v. City of Gonzales,72 which again involved a challenge to a municipality’s refusal
to allow the development of an apartment complex designed for lowincome residents. The developers brought both intent and effect
claims under the FHA and other laws.73 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on a number of the plaintiffs’
claims including their FHA disparate-impact claim,74 but upheld their
FHA claims based on intentional discrimination against minorities and
segregative effect.75 Thus, Summerchase provided another example of
a situation in which a segregative-effect claim might prevail in the

tent and disparate impact); and Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d. Cir.
1977) (discussed supra note 48). See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2519; see also
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing, in
another pre-Inclusive Communities appellate decision, the FHA’s segregative-effect
theory in the course of holding that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of
disparate impact).
71. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,469 n.103 (Feb. 15, 2013). For a description of other cases
that dealt with the FHA’s segregative-effect theory during the period between the
Huntington decision in 1988 and HUD’s 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation, see
infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text and infra note 276. See also Davis v.
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (vacating, based on inadequate
findings below, an injunction barring defendant from amending its tenant-selection
criteria to favor working families, which the district court had found likely to violate
the FHA by perpetuating segregation at some of defendant’s projects).
72. 970 F. Supp. 522 (M.D. La. 1997).
73. Id. at 526.
74. Id. at 527–28 (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs’ FHA familial status claims alleging intentional discrimination, disparate impact, and segregative effect); id. at 528–30 (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs’ FHA disparateimpact claim alleging discrimination against minorities); id. at 531–40 (discussing
summary judgment rulings on plaintiffs’ non-FHA claims).
75. Id. at 527 (upholding plaintiffs’ FHA race-based claim alleging intentional discrimination); id. at 530–31 (upholding plaintiffs’ FHA race-based claim alleging segregative effect).
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absence of a successful disparate-impact claim.76 However, the Summerchase opinion is not useful in terms of identifying the proof necessary to support a segregative-effect claim, because the court provided
only a brief summary of the facts.77
By contrast, a detailed picture of the racial demographics was
provided in Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale.78 Here, the court, after a
bench trial, ruled in 2000 that the defendant-town’s zoning restrictions
were racially motivated in violation of various civil rights laws and
also had both a disparate impact and segregative effect that violated
the FHA.79 Sunnyvale, a small white suburb of Dallas, Texas, had
banned all apartments and required one-acre lots for other residential
developments, which, inter alia, blocked an affordable multifamily
proposal that would have included minority residents.80 In addition to
holding that the Town’s refusal to allow multifamily housing disproportionately harmed blacks,81 the court ruled that “Sunnyvale’s ban on
apartments and stubborn insistence on large lot, low density zoning
also perpetuate racial segregation in Dallas County.”82 Sunnyvale’s
population was overwhelmingly white and:
Racial segregation can also be seen by a comparison of the population in the areas of Garland and Mesquite immediately adjoining
Sunnyvale. These areas are zoned for multifamily and smaller single-family lot sizes. Not surprisingly, several HUD-assisted apartment complexes exist in Mesquite and Garland, near
76. The court cited Huntington and Arlington Heights for the proposition that discriminatory effect under the FHA “may be proven by either (1) a showing of disparate
impact, or (2) a showing of segregative effect.” Id. at 528.
77. See id. at 526 n.1 (noting that the “facts of this case are voluminous” and that
only a brief summary would be provided in the opinion). The court did find that the
likely racial make-up of the proposed project would be about seventy-eight percent
white and twenty-two percent minority, id. at 530, but the racial demographics of the
community in which the project was to be located were not given. According to the
1990 Census, the City of Gonzales had a population of 7003, of whom approximately
seventy-five percent were white, twenty-four percent were black, and two percent
were Hispanic. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CP-1-20,
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: LOUISIANA
(1992), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1990/cp-1/cp-1-20.pdf.
78. 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 567–68 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
79. Id. at 563–73. In assessing the FHA-effect claims, the Dews opinion, like Summerchase, quoted Huntington for the proposition that discriminatory effect “may be
proven by showing either (1) ‘adverse impact on a particular minority group’ or (2)
‘harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation.’” Id. at 564.
80. Id. at 537–59. Sunnydale had a population of 2228 in 1990. Id. at 538. “[T]he
percentage breakdown of Sunnyvale’s households was 97% white and 0.95% black.”
Id. at 539. The court did not identify how many units would be in the proposed development nor the likely proportion of minority residents it would have.
81. Id. at 565–67.
82. Id. at 567.
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Sunnyvale. . . . Mesquite and Garland have the largest numbers of
DHA’s [Dallas Housing Authority’s] African-American section 8
tenants of all the Dallas County suburbs. Mesquite and Garland
both operate their own section 8 programs in addition to providing
housing for DHA’s section 8 tenants residing in their respective
Cities. . . . There is no question that Sunnyvale’s planning and zoning practices as well as its preclusion of private construction of
multifamily and less costly single-family housing perpetuate segregation in a town that is 97 percent white.83

Having determined that the Town’s actions had a discriminatory effect, the court went on to rule that its justifications for those actions
were inadequate and thus they violated the FHA.84
Prior to HUD’s issuance of its 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation, a number of FHA appellate decisions recognized the segregativeeffect theory, without having to determine whether liability should be
based on it.85 Most of these cases, like Summerchase and Dews, involved race-based challenges to a municipality’s blocking of a proposed affordable housing development. The few decisions that did
83. Id. at 567–68 (footnotes omitted).
The fact that Sunnyvale’s low-density zoning perpetuates racial segregation is further demonstrated by examining census tract 181.04, which includes almost all of the population and occupied housing units in
Sunnyvale, as well as a portion of Mesquite. The total occupied units for
tract 181.04 are 3.74% black and 5.1% Hispanic. The occupied units for
the portion of the tract in Sunnyvale are 0.96% black and 0.55% Hispanic. The occupied units for the portion of tract 181.04 in Mesquite are
8.26% black and 12.5% Hispanic. A comparison with the population in
the Garland census tract (181.15) that is next to Sunnyvale shows the
same pattern. The total population for that tract is 7.45% black and 6.64%
Hispanic. In census tract 181.15, the block groups that are adjacent to
Sunnyvale are 4.41%, 9.46%, and 11.32% black.
Id. at 567–68 (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 568–69. Following Huntington, the court held that the Town’s burden in a
FHA-effect case was to show that it was furthering a legitimate, bona fide interest and
had no less discriminatory alternative. Id. at 568. As noted above, this standard has
since been replaced by HUD’s 2013 discriminatory-effect regulation. See supra notes
13–14 and accompanying text. In Dews, the Town’s justifications included protecting
the public health from problems with septic tanks and regional obligations regarding
environmental and other issues, which the court held were not proven and also capable of being advanced by zoning alternatives that the Town had rejected. 109 F. Supp.
2d at 568–69.
85. See Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x 581, 585 (11th Cir. 2009);
Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 378 (6th Cir. 2007); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton
County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006); Edwards v. Johnston Cty. Health
Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223–24 (4th Cir. 1989). These four decisions affirmed summary judgments against disparate-impact claims. Only the Bonasera plaintiff advocated a segregative-effect claim on appeal, but the court did not separately analyze
this claim. See 342 F. App’x at 585–86.
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rule on segregative-effect claims found the facts insufficient to establish a prima facie case, usually because the plaintiff’s development,
though likely to include a substantial number of minorities, was proposed for an area that was already integrated.86
3. Cases after the HUD Regulation
a. Inclusive Communities
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive
Communities endorsing FHA disparate-impact claims barely mentioned the segregative-effect theory.87 Still, the Court’s opinion did
endorse some lower-court decisions upholding segregative-effect
claims. The opinion also contained noteworthy comments on the FHA,
its integration goals, and the limits of its reach in claims not based on
intentional discrimination.
Justice Kennedy pointed out that recognizing disparate-impact
claims is “consistent with the FHA’s central purpose [which is] to
eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s
economy.”88 With respect to challenging governmental practices, the
FHA’s impact theory “mandates the ‘removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers,’ [as] the FHA aims to ensure that [valid
governmental policies and priorities] can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.”89
Thus, the practices made unlawful by the FHA “include zoning laws
and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minori-

86. See Artisan/Am. Corp. v. City of Alvin, 588 F.3d 291, 299 n.20 (5th Cir. 2009);
Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1383 (N.D. Ga.
2005), aff’d, 466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006); accord (from the pre-Huntington period) Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussed supra
note 54); In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1166–68 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d sub nom.
Malone v. City of Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision)
(discussed supra note 40).
In Hallmark Developers, the plaintiff unsuccessfully pursued both disparate-impact and segregative-effect theories before the trial court, but only advanced its disparate-impact claim on appeal. See 466 F.3d at 1286. In ruling against the segregativeeffect claim, the district court noted that, unlike Black Jack and other cases where
such a claim had succeeded because an integrated development was proposed in an
all-white suburb, the plaintiff’s blocked development here was to be built in an area
that was already integrated and that, regardless of the fate of this development, “likely
will remain a racially mixed, predominantly African-American area, just as it was
previously.” 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015).
89. Id. at 2522 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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ties from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification.”90
According to Inclusive Communities, “[s]uits targeting such practices
reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability,” a proposition for
which the Court cited Huntington and Black Jack as examples.91
Again citing Huntington, the Court noted that the disparate-impact
theory has allowed plaintiffs to vindicate the FHA’s objectives “by
stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in practice, discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types of
housing units.”92
Other points made in Inclusive Communities are worth noting.
First, in its penultimate paragraph, Justice Kennedy’s opinion recognized the FHA’s role “in our Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation [and in] striving to achieve our ‘historic commitment to
creating an integrated society.’ ”93 The opinion concluded:
[S]ince the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and against the
backdrop of disparate-impact liability in nearly every jurisdiction,
many cities have become more diverse. The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner Commission’s grim prophecy
that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal.” Kerner Commission Report 1. The
Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in
moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.94

Second, the opinion noted that the disparate-impact theory “plays a
role in uncovering discriminatory intent [by permitting] plaintiffs to
counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape
easy classification as disparate treatment.”95 Third, while the Court’s
decision endorsing FHA disparate-impact claims did not rely on giving deference to HUD’s 2013 regulation, Justice Kennedy did cite this
regulation and HUD’s commentary on it with apparent approval on a
number of occasions.96 Finally, the Court’s opinion, in discounting the
90. Id. at 2521–22.
91. Id. at 2522.
92. Id. (citing Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18
(1988) (per curiam)). The Huntington citation here was to the Court’s own decision in
that case, but the Inclusive Communities opinion elsewhere cited the Second Circuit’s
decision in Huntington, along with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arlington
Heights and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Black Jack, as being among the appellate
decisions that Congress had “accepted and ratified” when it enacted the 1988 amendments to the FHA. See id. at 2519–20.
93. 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
94. Id. at 2525–26.
95. Id. at 2522.
96. See id. at 2514–15, 2522, and 2523.
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defendant’s fear of the negative consequences that would attend recognition of disparate-impact liability, pointed to that theory’s long
provenance.97 All of these points support not only the disparate-impact theory, but the segregative-effect theory as well.
But the Inclusive Communities opinion also insisted that certain
limits be placed on the FHA’s disparate-impact theory in order “to
protect potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact
claims.”98 Justice Kennedy quoted with approval HUD’s view that
“disparate-impact liability ‘does not mandate that affordable housing
be located in neighborhoods with any particular characteristic.’ ”99
More generally, an impact claim “that relies on a statistical disparity
must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity. A robust causality requirement ensures that
‘[r]acial imbalance . . . does not, without more, establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants from being held
liable for racial disparities they did not create.”100 Impact-based challenges based solely on racial imbalances, according to Inclusive Communities, “would almost inexorably lead . . . to . . . numerical quotas,”
presumably because potential defendants would seek racial balance to
avoid liability, a situation that would raise “serious constitutional
questions.”101 As with the principles discussed in the previous paragraph, these “cautionary standards” for FHA-impact claims102 might
reflect more broadly the Court’s concerns with non-intent claims

97. Specifically, the Court noted:
In light of the longstanding judicial interpretation of the FHA to encompass disparate-impact claims and congressional reaffirmation of that result, residents and policymakers have come to rely on the availability of
disparate-impact claims. . . . Indeed, many of our Nation’s largest cities—
entities that are potential defendants in disparate-impact suits—have submitted an amicus brief in this case supporting disparate-impact liability
under the FHA. . . . The existence of disparate-impact liability in the
substantial majority of the Courts of Appeals for the last several decades
“has not given rise to . . . dire consequences.”
Id. at 2525 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012)).
98. Id. at 2524.
99. Id. at 2523 (quoting 78 Fed. Reg. 11,476 (Feb. 15, 2013)).
100. Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). A
related point, as discussed infra note 146 and accompanying text, was that FHAimpact claims could only challenge general policies and not one-time decisions. See
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523–24.
101. Id. at 2523.
102. See id. at 2524.
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under the FHA and thus apply as well to the segregative-effect theory
of liability.103
b. Lower-Court Decisions
Since 2013, when HUD promulgated its discriminatory-effect
regulation,104 four appellate decisions involving FHA segregative-effect claims have been reported.105 In 2015, the Second Circuit in Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs 106 reinstated a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, an affordable housing developer,
against a municipality accused of racial and familial status discrimination in blocking the plaintiff’s proposed project.107
In Anderson, the plaintiff proposed a 250–300 unit development
on the outskirts of the City, with twenty percent of the units to be
rented at affordable rates to low-and-moderate income households.108
The City, a seasonal tourist mecca some forty miles north of Albany,
New York, had 26,000 year-round residents and an urgent need for
affordable housing, most of which was concentrated in two downtown
103. In this regard, the Court’s discussion of Step Two of an impact claim would
seem to apply equally to Step Two in a segregative-effect claim. As to this point, the
Inclusive Communities opinion noted that, even if a prima facie case of disparate
impact is proven, the defendant can still prevail by showing that its policy is justified;
thus:
An important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact
liability is properly limited is to give housing [defendants] leeway to state
and explain the valid interest served by their policies. . . . Just as an
employer may maintain a workplace requirement that causes a disparate
impact if that requirement is a “reasonable measure[ment] of job performance,” [Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)], so too
must housing authorities and private developers be allowed to maintain a
policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.
Id.
104. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
105. During this period, the Seventh Circuit ruled on a FHA-impact issue in a case
that did not present a segregative-effect claim. See City of Joliet v. New West, L.P.,
825 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Mid-City Nat. Bank of Chi. v.
City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 518 (Nov. 28, 2016) (No. 16-485) (discussed infra notes
256–263 and accompanying text). Also during this period, a number of district court
decisions dealt with FHA-impact claims, see, e.g., cases referenced supra note 8, but
most, like Joliet, did not also deal with the segregative-effect theory.
106. 805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015). This decision came a few months after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities (discussed supra Section I.C.3.a).
107. The defendant’s blocking of the proposed development allegedly “perpetuated
racial discrimination in Saratoga Springs, and had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans and families with children.” Id. at 41.
108. Id. at 40. An “affordable” unit was, according to HUD’s definition, “one that
costs no more than 30% of the total annual household income.” Id. at 39 n.1.
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neighborhoods.109 However, the City rezoned the plaintiff’s property
to prevent construction of the proposed development.110
The governing FHA legal framework, based on Huntington, allowed the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
effect by showing either disparate impact or perpetuation of segregation, which then required the defendant to prove a bona fide and legitimate justification for its action with no less discriminatory alternative
available.111 The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff-developer, finding
that the City’s action had both a disparate impact on blacks and families with children and also perpetuated race-based segregation, but the
jury held the City liable only on the impact theory because it found the
City’s justifications sufficient to excuse the segregative effect.112 The
district court, finding the jury’s verdict inconsistent, granted the City’s
motion for a new trial, at which the City prevailed on all claims.113
The developer appealed, and the Second Circuit held that its verdict in the first trial should not have been set aside.114 According to
the Anderson opinion, while Huntington categorized adverse impact
and perpetuation of segregation as subspecies of discriminatory-effect
claims, it did not deal with whether:
[A]n asserted governmental interest justification that was sufficient
to defeat liability as to one type of discriminatory effect also sufficed to defeat liability on the other. Huntington . . . therefore
leaves open the possibility that a rule or policy may be invalidated
on the ground that the legitimate governmental interest served can
be achieved by alternatives with less discriminatory effect on families with children, even though that same legitimate governmental
interest cannot be achieved by alternatives with less segregating
effect on the community.115
109. Id. at 38–39.
These neighborhoods were comprised of three Census tracts . . . . Three
“block groups” within these Census tracts were largely made up of lowto-moderate income residents. The same three block groups also contained a concentration of the City’s minority residents. While these residents comprised only 5.5% of the City’s overall population, the
populations of the three block groups were, respectively, 31.2%, 51.6%,
and 71.8% non-white.
Id. at 39 n.2.
110. Id. at 38–40.
111. See id. at 49 (citing Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d Cir. 1988)).
112. Id. at 43.
113. Id. at 43–44.
114. Id. at 46–50.
115. Id. at 49–50.
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The result was that the developer prevailed on its FHA-effect claim.116
Further, the original jury’s determination that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of race-based segregative effect remained
intact.117 The case thus provides an example of a plaintiff successfully
proving such a prima facie case, albeit one that was shown to be justified by the defendant.
A few months after Anderson, the Second Circuit produced another decision on this issue in Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of
Nassau,118 which essentially affirmed the plaintiffs’ victory in challenging a white city’s opposition to a proposed 300-unit mixed-income development whose likely tenants would be eighteen to thirtytwo percent minority.119 The principal defendant in Mhany was Garden City, which is located in suburban Nassau County, New York.
Blacks and Hispanics, who accounted for fifteen percent of Nassau
County’s population, but most of its low-income households and
eighty-eight percent of its Section 8 waiting list, made up only between two percent and four percent of Garden City’s residents.120 The
County asked the City to zone land for the proposed multi-family development, but the City, in response to local opposition, instead designated the site for a single-family development.121 The developer and
others sued the City for intentional discrimination in violation of various civil rights laws and for effect-based discrimination under the
FHA.122
116. See id. at 56. The Second Circuit did approve some reduction in the original
jury’s $1 million damage award and remanded the case for a new trial solely on the
issue of damages. Id. at 51–56.
117. Because the City did not appeal the district court’s denial of its motion for
judgment as a matter of law on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, the Second Circuit did “not consider whether the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to
make out a prima facie FHA disparate impact claim” or satisfy the Supreme Court’s
decision in Inclusive Communities. Id. at 51 n.8. Nor was this issue presented to the
Second Circuit with respect to the initial jury’s finding of segregative effect.
118. 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
119. Id. at 587–88, 598. The proposed development would have included affordable
and Section 8 apartments and was estimated to contain between 56 and 101 minority
households. Id. at 598. As in Anderson, see supra note 108, the Second Circuit in
Mhany accepted a definition of affordable housing as requiring “no more than 30% of
a household’s income for households earning 80% or less of the [median income in
the area].” 819 F.3d at 588 n.1.
120. Id. at 588.
121. Id. at 590–98.
122. Id. at 598. The plaintiffs also sued the County for discrimination in not pressuring Garden City to accept the development. Id. The district court granted summary
judgment for the County on these claims, id., which the Second Circuit later partially
reversed, but not on grounds involving the FHA’s discriminatory-effect theory, id. at
620–24.
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After a bench trial, the district court ruled against the City on the
plaintiffs’ intent claims.123 Based on Huntington’s framework for
FHA-effect claims, the court also found the City’s action had both a
disparate impact on minorities and a segregative effect, which violated
the FHA because the City, while having a legitimate justification for
its action, failed to prove that there was no less discriminatory alternative.124 On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld liability on the intent
claim125 and affirmed the findings of discriminatory effect and justification,126 but remanded for further proceedings on the “less discriminatory alternative” issue.127
Two days after Mhany, the Ninth Circuit decided Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma,128 which upheld the plaintiffs’ intentbased claims challenging the defendant’s refusal to rezone land for a
moderately priced, predominantly Hispanic development and also
ruled that summary judgment, while appropriate against the plaintiffs’
FHA segregative-effect claim, should not have been entered against
their disparate-impact claim.129 Yuma’s Hispanic population was
“concentrated in several areas in the northern, western, and central
portions of the City [where] substantially all of the available low- to
moderate-income housing was located,” while the City’s white popu123. Id. at 599, 617.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 605–16.
126. Id. at 616–20. With respect to the disparate-impact claim, the trial judge concluded that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, finding that the City’s
rejection of the requested multi-family zoning “largely eliminated the potential for the
type of housing that minorities were disproportionately likely to need—namely, affordable rental units.” Id. at 617. With respect to the segregative-effect claim, the
district court concluded that the City’s zoning restriction “on the development of
multi-family housing perpetuates segregation generally because it decreases the availability of housing to minorities in a municipality where minorities constitute approximately only 4.1% of the overall population . . . and only 2.6% of the population living
in households.” Id. at 620.
127. Id. at 616–20. Mhany held that the HUD regulation’s approach on this point,
which puts the burden of proof in this third step of a FHA-effect claim on the plaintiff,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3)),
must now be followed even to the point of abrogating prior Second Circuit precedent
like Huntington that had put this burden on the defendant, 819 F.3d at 617–19. The
Mhany opinion did, however, “agree with the district court’s assessment that plaintiffs
more than established a prima facie case [of discriminatory effect and] also agree[d]
that Defendants identified legitimate, bona fide governmental interests, such as increased traffic and strain on public schools.” Id. at 620. The FHA-effect claim was
therefore remanded for consideration of whether the plaintiffs met their burden on the
“less discriminatory alternative” issue. Id.
128. 818 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. City of Yuma v. Ave. 6E
Invs., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 295 (Oct. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1545).
129. Id. at 496–97, 513.
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lation lived mainly “in separate areas in the northwest and southeast of
Yuma in which they comprised more than 75% of the population.”130
The site chosen for the plaintiffs’ development was near a white-majority area in southeast Yuma, and the City denied their rezoning request allegedly “in response to animus by neighbors . . . who wished
to prevent the development of a heavily Hispanic neighborhood” in
their area.131
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the intentional discrimination claims, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on allegations
that the City was influenced by the neighbors’ race-based statements
of opposition.132 As for the FHA-effect claims, the Ninth Circuit held
that the trial court had erred in rejecting the plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim on the ground that other, similarly priced housing might be
available in the area.133 The appellate court also recognized that the
plaintiffs had asserted a separate perpetuation-of-segregation claim,
but it agreed “with the district court that they failed to set forth sufficient facts for any such claim.”134
As for the segregative-effect claim in City of Yuma, the Ninth
Circuit did not describe the plaintiffs’ proof supporting this claim, but
the district court, in rejecting it, had ruled:
Hispanics are not a minority in Yuma; they actually constitute 55%
of the population. In 2010, the southeastern area of Yuma had a
white population of somewhere between 48% and 65%, down from
75% in 1990. Therefore, at the time of the rezoning in 2008, the
numbers show that Hispanics were integrating into the area. Also,
assuming that the Plaintiffs’ proposed development would have had
130. Id. at 498.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 503–07. According to the City of Yuma opinion, the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Arlington Heights case, see supra note 47, governed the issue of
whether the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that “in violation of the FHA and the
Equal Protection Clause, an ‘invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor’ behind the City’s decision to deny the zoning application,” 818 F.3d at 504 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
One of the Arlington Heights factors that suggested intentional discrimination was the
disparate impact of the City’s decision, which the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had
adequately alleged. Id. at 508.
133. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d at 509–13. On this point, the district court, in granting
summary judgment against the plaintiffs, had relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion
in Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006),
which the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d at 510–12. Having decided that this claim would have to be remanded for further consideration, the
Ninth Circuit directed the lower court to determine in the first instance whether the
plaintiffs’ proof showed “a disparate impact on minorities resulting from denial of the
rezoning application.” Id. at 512.
134. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d at 513.
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been about half Hispanic and half white as Plaintiffs claim, the integrative effect of that development in southeastern Yuma, which
was somewhere around 48% and 65% white based on the 2010
Census, would not have been significant enough to support a disparate impact claim.135

The district court noted that in Huntington, the Second Circuit had
observed that the “area around the property at issue was 98% white
and a disproportionate percentage of people on the waiting list for
housing that would have been built on the property were minorities,”
and the Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights had described the defendant-Village as “almost totally white in a metropolitan area with a
significant percentage of black people. Since [the proposed project]
would have to be racially integrated in order to qualify for federal
subsidization, the Village’s action in preventing the project from being
built had the effect of perpetuating segregation.”136
In mid-2016, the D.C. Circuit produced a limited decision involving a FHA segregative-effect claim in Boykin v. Fenty,137 which rejected a challenge to the District of Columbia’s closure of an
integrated homeless shelter known as “La Casa” in a predominantly
white area of the city. The plaintiffs in Boykin were “forty-two
predominantly black and Hispanic former residents of the La Casa
shelter, some of whom are disabled.”138 They brought a variety of
civil rights claims, all of which were dismissed at the pleading stage
except for their FHA race-impact claim, which failed on summary
judgment.139
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on all
claims.140 The Boykin opinion added a final paragraph disposing of
135. Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-cv-00297 JWS, 2013 WL
2455928, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013) (footnotes omitted). The last phrase here might
suggest that the court was conflating the disparate-impact and segregative-effect theories, but this seems unlikely, given that its opinion earlier had conducted a separate
analysis focusing on the data underlying the plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim. See id.
at *3–7.
For cases reaching similar conclusions in rejecting segregative-effect claims, see
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
136. 2013 WL 2455928, at *7 n.70 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013) (citing Huntington, 844
F.2d at 937, and quoting Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288).
137. 650 F. App’x 42, 44–45 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
138. Id. at 43.
139. Id. at 45.
140. Id. at 44–45. With respect to the plaintiffs’ FHA-impact claims, Boykin held
that their disability-based claim was properly dismissed because “[t]he complaint
failed to allege facts suggesting that the closure affected a greater proportion of disabled individuals than non-disabled,” id. at 44, and that summary judgment against
their race-based claim was proper because the plaintiffs “failed to establish a causal
link between the challenged action—the closing of La Casa as part of the [Permanent
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the plaintiffs’ FHA segregative-effect claim, primarily on failure-ofproof grounds:
Appellants contend that the District’s closure of La Casa in the
northwest quadrant of the city, alongside its [Permanent Supportive
Housing (PSH)] placements in predominantly minority areas of the
city, had an unlawful segregative effect on housing patterns. Appellants have done little to analyze the data to show that La Casa’s
closure and the District’s PSH placements had any segregative effect, particularly when taking into account the District’s plans to
develop PSH units in the city’s northwest quadrant. But even assuming appellants established a prima facie case of segregative effect, they failed to rebut the legitimacy of the District’s criteria for
selecting PSH sites . . . or to show that the District could have
employed those criteria without contributing to segregative housing
patterns.141

4. Summary of Past Cases
With the exception of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Boykin, all of
the reported cases involving FHA segregative-effect claims have challenged exclusionary zoning decisions. All have also involved racebased claims, although three have also alleged other illegal bases of
discrimination (namely, familial status in Anderson and Summerchase
and disability in Boykin). Some claims have challenged defendants’
land-use policies, but others have focused on particular zoning decisions;142 this is significant, because a disparate-impact claim, according to Inclusive Communities, may challenge only a defendant’s
policy, not a one-time decision.143
Indeed, the ultimate question is whether the FHA’s segregativeeffect theory adds anything to the disparate-impact theory as now endorsed by the Supreme Court. In the cases reviewed thus far, the answer has been “not much.” The only successful segregative-effect
claims have always been accompanied by at least a plausible dispaSupportive Housing] program—and any disparate impact on a protected population,”
id. at 45.
141. Id. at 45. The Boykin opinion ended this paragraph by concluding that “[t]he
district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the District on
the count of disparate impact based on race.” Id. The last phrase here might suggest
that the D.C. Circuit was conflating the disparate-impact and segregative-effect theories, but this seems unlikely, given that its opinion earlier had conducted a separate
analysis focusing on the plaintiffs’ race-based disparate-impact claim. See id.
142. These include Arlington Heights, see text accompanying notes 42–45, Black
Jack, see text accompanying note 32, City of Yuma, see text accompanying notes
128–129, and Summerchase, see text accompanying notes 72–73.
143. See infra note 146; see also infra Section II.A.1.
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rate-impact or other FHA claim;144 sometimes an impact claim has
succeeded where a segregative-effect claim has failed,145 but the opposite has never occurred. Thus, the issue of what, if anything, the
segregative-effect theory adds to potential FHA liability remains open
for future litigation and is explored next in Part II.
ISSUES

IN

II.
FUTURE FHA SEGREGATIVE-EFFECT CASES

A. Unresolved Issues in Segregative-Effect Claims
1. Challenging “One-Time” Versus “Policy” Decisions
The Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities made clear that
FHA disparate-impact claims, like those under Title VII, may challenge only a defendant’s general policies and not its one-time decisions.146 The FHA’s segregative-effect theory, however, is built on
appellate decisions involving challenges to individual zoning decisions blocking specific housing proposals. Nothing else was at stake in
Arlington Heights; and, although Black Jack and Huntington involved
challenges to land-use laws that were applicable throughout the municipality, the basic focus of those cases was the defendant’s use of
those laws to block a particular development. Important questions after Inclusive Communities include whether a disparate-impact claim
may challenge a zoning scheme used to block a specific housing proposal as a “policy,”147 and, if not, whether this situation might still be
addressed by a segregative-effect claim. However, the broader issue
considered here is whether the segregative-effect theory applies generally in single-decision situations and thereby goes beyond the reach of
disparate-impact theory.
144. In a few cases like Arlington Heights, the disparate-impact claim was perceived
as weaker than the segregative-effect claim. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussed in text accompanying notes 49–51); see also Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F.
Supp. 522 (M.D. La. 1997) (disparate-impact claim failed while segregative-effect
claim survived, but the latter was not uniquely important because discriminatory intent was also shown); notes 72–75 and accompanying text (describing Summerchase).
145. Examples include Anderson, see text accompanying notes 112–117, and City of
Yuma, see text accompanying notes 132–133.
146. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015). For more on this requirement, see Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 693.
147. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d Cir.
2016) (holding that the defendant-city’s action in blocking a particular housing development here qualified as a policy, not just a one-time decision, that could be appropriately challenged under the disparate-impact theory). See also supra notes 118–126
and accompanying text.
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A number of reasons suggest an affirmative answer. The first is
that the early decisions endorsing the segregative-effect theory often
involved single-decision situations. In addition to these exclusionary
zoning cases, another important appellate ruling—the Third Circuit’s
1970 decision in Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development 148—also concluded that the FHA could be violated by a
particular housing project’s segregative effect, albeit the Shannon
plaintiffs alleged that this illegal effect was caused by the defendants’
supporting, rather than opposing, this project.149
Another reason is that HUD’s 2013 regulation, which now governs the standards for FHA-effect cases (at least to the extent it is not
inconsistent with Inclusive Communities),150 is written in a way that
seems to apply to one-decision situations. The pertinent language of
this regulation provides for potential liability for “[a] practice . . .
where it actually or predictably . . . creates, increases, reinforces, or
perpetuates segregated housing patterns.”151 The term “a practice”—
which later becomes the antecedent for “it”—suggests a singular act,
as opposed to only a set of acts decreed by a generalized policy.152
This understanding is reinforced by the FHA itself, which defines a
“discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is unlawful under
section 804, 805, 806, or 818” of the statute.153 The referenced sections outlaw a variety of singular acts, such as refusal to rent “a dwelling to any person because of race.”154
Finally, the goal of the segregative-effect theory and the HUD
regulation would best be served by applying it to single-act, as well as
148. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
149. See id. at 811–12. For a further description of Shannon, see infra note 187.
150. See, e.g., Mhany, 819 F.3d at 617–19 (holding, post-Inclusive Communities,
that courts must follow the HUD regulation’s standards, even to the point of abrogating prior judicial precedent).
151. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017). The full text of this regulation is set forth supra
note 17.
152. See also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,468–69 (Feb. 15, 2013) (noting that “[w]hether a particular practice results in a discriminatory effect is a fact-specific inquiry” and that
“identifying the specific practice that caused the alleged discriminatory effect will
depend on the facts of a particular situation and therefore must be determined on a
case-by-case basis” (emphasis added)).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2015) (referring to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, 3606, and
3617).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2015). Numerous courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs
under this provision for a single refusal to rent. See, e.g., Davis v. Mansards, 597 F.
Supp. 334, 342–43 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Williamson v. Hampton Mgmt. Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see also Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that discriminatory eviction proceedings directed against individual
black tenant established a prima facie case of FHA liability).
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policy, decisions—as demonstrated by single-decision cases like Arlington Heights and in a variety of other situations described below.
2.

Standards and Statistical Evidence in Segregative-Effect Claims
a.

Appropriate Statistical Evidence and Elements of the Claim

The nature of the statistical evidence needed to make out a prima
facie case differs in disparate-impact and segregative-effect claims. In
impact cases, the focus is how the defendant’s challenged policy affects protected versus non-protected classes in the market area for the
housing at issue.155 The geographic focus in segregative-effect cases is
often a smaller area—such as the specific towns in Black Jack and
Arlington Heights, and the specific neighborhoods in Huntington and
City of Yuma.156 Indeed, HUD’s articulation of the segregative-effect
theory speaks in terms of a “community” being injured, not a protected class as in impact claims.157 This language implies that the
proper focus in a segregative-effect claim is limited by the boundaries
of this harmed community.158 While a variety of data sources may be
used in disparate-impact cases,159 the segregative-effect precedents
suggest a fairly straightforward approach that relies almost exclusively
on local census data.160
HUD’s discriminatory-effect regulation requires two elements for
a segregative-effect claim: (1) there must be “segregated housing patterns because of race [or other protected characteristic]” in the relevant community; and (2) the defendant’s challenged practice must
“create[ ], increase[ ], reinforce[ ], or perpetuate[ ]” these segregated
155. See, e.g., supra note 47; see also Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at
701–02.
156. See supra text accompanying note 33 (Black Jack); note 42 and accompanying
text (Arlington Heights); text accompanying notes 55–57 (Huntington); text accompanying notes 129–130 (City of Yuma).
157. See Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469 (noting that an illegal practice
under this theory causes “harm to the community generally by creating, increasing,
reinforcing, or perpetuating segregated housing patterns”).
158. For more on the proper definition of “community” in segregative-effect cases,
see infra Section II.A.3.
159. See Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 710–18.
160. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir.
2016) (discussed supra note 120 and accompanying text); Anderson Grp., LLC v.
City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussed supra note
109 and accompanying text); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 929–31, 937 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (discussed supra notes
55–57 and accompanying text); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286–89, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussed supra note 42 and
accompanying text); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537–59,
565–68 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (discussed supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text).
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patterns.161 Both elements require statistical proof, but the limited guidance provided by HUD and prior cases suggests that such evidence
need not be sophisticated.162
With respect to the first element, early appellate cases simply relied on race-based census figures for the local community. In Arlington Heights, for example, the Seventh Circuit found “overwhelming”
racial segregation based on census data showing that the Village’s
population was ninety-nine percent white in a metropolitan area than
included many black residents.163 Other cases reached the same conclusion based on data showing a suburban community or neighborhood was ninety-four to ninety-nine percent white.164 Courts that
found the plaintiffs’ proof inadequate noted that the percentage of minorities living in the target community roughly mirrored the overall
area’s racial demographics.165 Thus, while sophisticated techniques do
exist for measuring segregation in metropolitan areas, courts have not
used these methodologies to determine whether the first element has
been established.166
161. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a).
162. See supra note 160 (identifying cases). HUD has specifically cautioned that its
discriminatory-effect regulation was not designed “to describe how data and statistics
may be used in the application of the [effect] standard” nor did it provide “a codification of how data and statistics may be used in the application of the standard.” Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,468; see also id. (“Whether a particular practice results
in a discriminatory effect is a fact-specific inquiry. Given the numerous and varied
practices and wide variety of private and governmental entities covered by the Act, it
would be impossible to specify in the rule the showing that would be required to
demonstrate a discriminatory effect in each of these contexts.”).
163. 558 F.2d at 1286–87, 1291; see supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
164. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 928–931, 937 (describing the Town as ninety-five
percent white and the relevant community as ninety-eight percent white); Black Jack,
508 F.2d at 1183 (describing the relevant community as ninety-nine percent white);
Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 533–59, 567–68 (describing the relevant community as
ninety-four to ninety-seven percent white); see also supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text (Huntington); supra note 33 and accompanying text (Black Jack); supra
notes 80, 83 and accompanying text (Dews).
165. See supra note 40 (In re Malone); supra note 54 (Suffolk and Arthur); supra
text accompanying note 135 (City of Yuma).
166. The most commonly used method for measuring racial segregation is the dissimilarity index. See Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 717 n.137; see also
Charles M. Lamb et al., HMDA, Housing Segregation, and Racial Disparities in
Mortgage Lending, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 249, 267 (2016) (describing the dissimilarity index). There are other measures as well. See, e.g., Brief for Housing Scholars
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL
7405732, at *5–6 (describing the “exposure index” and opining that it is a better
measure of black-white segregation than the dissimilarity index); Leah Hendey &
Mychal Cohen, USING DATA TO ASSESS FAIR HOUSING AND IMPROVE ACCESS TO OP-
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The second element has also been easy for the plaintiffs to satisfy. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights concluded
that construction of the proposed development “would be a significant
step toward integrating the community” and thus the Village’s blocking of it would perpetuate segregation.167 The court reached this conclusion by simply assuming that the development’s racial make-up
would reflect the income-eligible population in the overall metropolitan area (i.e., forty percent black), which would result in an increase of
seventy-six black families (i.e., forty percent of the project’s 190
units).168 This would still leave Arlington Heights’s population of
65,000 to 67,000 over ninety-nine percent white, hardly a “significant
step” toward integrating the Village. Still, most courts have followed a
similar analysis; that is, so long as the plaintiff can show that a proposed housing development is likely to include a sizeable portion of
minorities, e.g., because it is subsidized in a racially diverse metropolitan area, a heavily white municipality that blocks such a project is
perpetuating segregation.169
Another factor mentioned in many of the segregative-effect cases
is the need for the type of affordable housing that the defendant-municipality has blocked.170 Sometimes, the opinions note that the defendant itself has recognized this need in, for example, reports it filed in
connection with receiving a HUD grant.171 It is unclear why such a
PORTUNITY:

A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS 23 (Urban Inst. 2017)
(describing dissimilarity, isolation, and other indices of segregation).
167. 558 F.2d at 1291; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 1291; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
169. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183, 1186 (discussed supra notes 33, 38 and
accompanying text); Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937–38 (discussed supra note 64 and
accompanying text); Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (discussed supra note 82 and
accompanying text). But see In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1984),
aff’d sub nom. Malone v. City of Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (unpublished
table decision) (discussed supra note 40).
170. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 509 (2d Cir. 2016)
(noting that “the lack of affordable housing has long been a problem for Nassau
County [and] Garden City contains no affordable housing”); Anderson Grp., LLC v.
City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that residents of the
defendant-City “have long faced a well-documented shortage of affordable housing”);
Huntington, 844 F.2d at 929 (noting that the defendant “Town has a shortage of affordable rental housing for low and moderate-income households”); Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d at 411 (noting that the plaintiffs’ proposed project would be “the
only subsidized housing in Arlington Heights despite a great demand for such housing
in that area”); Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188 (noting that the evidence demonstrated “a
strong demand for suburban apartments in St. Louis County”).
171. See Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citing the defendant-City’s analyses conducted as a HUD grantee showing that “the
Hispanic population in Yuma was concentrated in [three] portions of the City . . .
[and] that substantially all of the available low- to moderate-income housing was lo-
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showing of need is relevant to a segregative-effect claim, other than to
affirm the plaintiff-developer’s confidence that its proposed project
will fill up and thus contribute to integration in the area.172 Of course,
this evidence of need might be relevant to other issues in the case,
such as undercutting the defendant’s attempt to justify its behavior in
Step Two of an effect case173 or to suggest that the defendant’s proffered justification was simply a pretext for intentional discrimination.174 In any event, this type of evidence is now likely to be even
more accessible as a result of HUD’s recent reformation of its system
for requiring all of its municipal grantees to regularly conduct detailed
analyses of fair housing issues in their jurisdictions.175
cated in those areas”); Anderson, 805 F.3d at 39 (noting that the defendant-City’s
Consolidated Plan filed with HUD documented “a concentration of low-to-moderate
income residents in certain areas of the City, . . . where most of the City’s highdensity subsidized rental housing opportunities were located”); Huntington, 844 F.2d
at 929 (noting that the defendant-Town’s Housing Assistance Plan, which it “filed
with HUD as part of Huntington’s application for federal community development
funds, reveals that the impact of this [affordable rental housing] shortage is three
times greater on blacks than on the overall population”).
172. Cf. Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir.
2006) (rejecting FHA disparate-impact claim in part because the need for plaintiffdeveloper’s proposed project was belied by “the existence of other housing within the
price range proposed by Hallmark” and noting that “[i]f there is a glut in the market of
homes in Hallmark’s projected price range, the lack of the Hallmark’s particular development is not likely to have an impact on anyone, let alone adversely affect one
group disproportionately”). The Ninth Circuit has since expressed disagreement with
this position. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
174. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 612–15; City of Yuma, 818 F.3d at 507–09.
175. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272–371
(July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903). These
regulations require every HUD-fund recipient to take “meaningful actions, in addition
to combating discrimination, that overcome patterns of segregation and foster inclusive communities free from barriers that restrict access to opportunity based on [race
and other] protected characteristics.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2017) (defining “affirmatively furthering fair housing”). Grantees are required to prepare an assessment of fair
housing (AFH), which includes “an analysis of fair housing data, an assessment of fair
housing issues and contributing factors, and an identification of fair housing priorities
and goals.” Id. § 5.152. The AFH is viewed as central to a grantee’s AFH strategy by
requiring it “to assess the elements and factors that cause, increase, contribute to,
maintain, or perpetuate segregation, racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, significant disparities in access to opportunity, and disproportionate housing
needs.” Id. § 5.154(a). Local-government grantees are required to include, as part of
their periodic AFH planning process, a series of demographic maps. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Assessment Tool: Announcement of Final Approved
Document, 80 Fed. Reg. 81,840 (Dec. 31, 2015). For examples of demographic maps
covering various jurisdictions, see Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Tool, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://egis.hud.gov/affht/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
For a recent example of a municipal-grantee’s reports leading to a segregativeeffect charge against it, see U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Letter Finding Non-
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b. The “How Much” Issue
Another key issue is how much discriminatory effect must be
shown to establish a prima facie case. In impact cases, which build on
a long history of similar Title VII claims, there is general agreement
that a “substantial” disparity must be shown, and courts have come up
with some relatively straightforward measures of how much disparity
is sufficient.176 There is no such guidance in segregative-effect cases.
A few decisions have suggested that this theory requires that the challenged practice “significantly” perpetuate segregation,177 but most
cases do not mention this requirement, and in some successful claims,
the actual effect on a community’s segregation seems to be small.178
If a segregative-effect claim only requires two elements (i.e., that
the defendant-municipality is predominantly white and has rejected an
affordable housing proposal), it seems possible that every white community that blocks such a proposal would face such a claim.179 What’s
compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Case No. 06-16-R001-6, at
7–8 (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.taahp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/HUD-letterto-Mayor-Sylvester-Turner-find-civil-rights-violations.pdf, which found, in part based
on Houston’s own fair housing analyses in recent filings with HUD, that Houston’s
policies regarding the location of subsidized housing projects in the city perpetuated
segregation.
176. See Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 706–07 (discussing Title VII’s 4/5
standard and its equivalent in FHA disparate-impact cases).
177. See Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The
proper standard to be applied on remand is whether the proposed use of the working
family preference will significantly perpetuate segregation at the relevant NYCHA
developments.”); Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-cv-00297 JWS, 2013
WL 2455928, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 818 F.3d 493
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 295 (Oct. 11, 2016) (No. 15-1545) (rejecting segregative-effect claim because racial impact of the blocked development, which was proposed near an integrated area, was not “significant enough” to reduce segregation
there); see also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoted supra text accompanying note 51); In re Malone,
592 F. Supp. 1135, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Malone v. City of Fenton,
794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting segregative-effect
claim because plaintiff’s blocked development “would have only a de minimus [sic]
impact” on segregated housing patterns in the area).
178. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1291; supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text (discussing Arlington Heights).
179. One response to the implied criticism here that proving Step One of a segregative-effect claim would be too easy is to rely on Steps Two and Three of an effectcase analysis, see supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text, to ameliorate any unfairness to potential defendants. As the Third Circuit wrote in 2011 in rejecting a defendant’s argument that the court’s view of the plaintiff’s initial burden in a disparateimpact case was too easy:
The Township may be correct that a disparate impact analysis will often
allow plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case when a segregated neighborhood is redeveloped in circumstances where there is a shortage of al-
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more, the segregative-effect theory goes further. Recall that the HUD
regulation authorizes such a claim when a challenged practice not only
perpetuates segregated housing patterns, but also when it “increases”
or “reinforces” them.180 This part of the theory has rarely been
used,181 but it could be applied to housing-project approvals (e.g., by a
white suburb like Arlington Heights of any high-priced development,
which would presumably continue the community’s all-white character). This situation—where, say, a 99%-white suburb acts in a way
that would result in its becoming 99.1% white—suggests that a segregative-effect claim that relies on the “increases”/“reinforces” language
might falter on the “significant” requirement, lest the theory apply in
even de minimis situations.182 As noted earlier,183 this “how much”
issue has not been well-developed in the segregative-effect cases.

ternative affordable housing. But this is a feature of the FHA’s
programming, not a bug. . . . We need not be concerned that this approach
is too expansive because the establishment of a prima facie case, by itself, is not enough to establish liability under the FHA. It simply results
in a more searching inquiry into the defendant’s motivations—precisely
the sort of inquiry required to ensure that the government does not deprive people of housing “because of race.”
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d
375, 384–85 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, according to the Mount Holly opinion, because
FHA-effect cases may be based on either a disparate-impact or a segregative-effect
theory, a defendant “is free to argue that its plan is less discriminatory than all of the
available alternatives because it does the best job of integrating the neighborhood.
However, those arguments are properly considered in the context of the last steps of
the [FHA] analysis, not as a requirement of the prima facie case.” Id. at 385; see also
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2522–23 (2015) (noting that an “important and appropriate means of ensuring
that disparate-impact liability is properly limited” is the defendant’s opportunity in the
second step of the analysis to prove that its challenged policy “is necessary to achieve
a valid interest”); cf. id. at 2523–24 (directing courts to “examine with care whether a
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact” in order “to protect
potential defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims”).
180. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017) (quoted in full supra note 17).
181. The principal case is an early challenge to HUD’s approval of a heavily minority project in a city’s minority neighborhood. See Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (discussed infra note 187).
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text; see also Implementation of
the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,469
(Feb. 15, 2013) (responding to question about whether liability under the segregativeeffect theory “requires an attempt to segregate further, or merely a practice that continues existing patterns of segregation,” by generally defending this theory but not
providing any specific numerical guidance for determining if a particular practice sufficiently perpetuates segregation to produce liability); supra note 162 (describing
dearth of HUD guidance).
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3. Who/What Is the Community Harmed?
HUD’s discriminatory-effect regulation provides that a housing
practice may result in FHA liability by causing “harm to the community generally by creating, increasing, reinforcing, or perpetuating segregated housing patterns.”184 Thus, the segregative-effect theory
focuses on “harm to the community,” a phrase adopted from the Second Circuit’s 1988 decision in Huntington.185 As noted above, past
segregative-effect decisions have generally dealt with a specific suburban town or, as in Huntington, particular parts of the defendanttown.186 The question is how broadly the geographic area should be
defined in gauging whether a challenged practice harms “the
community.”
In addition to the segregative-effect decisions, early FHA cases
involving standing to sue are relevant here, particularly three decided
by the Supreme Court.187 The Court’s first FHA decision in 1972,
184. See Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469 (explaining 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500(a) (2017)).
185. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also infra note 323 (identifying
the relevant community in another Second Circuit case involving the FHA’s integration mandate as a particular neighborhood in New York City).
187. The three Supreme Court decisions discussed in this section were recently reaffirmed by the Court in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296,
1303–04 (2017).
In addition to these decisions, another early FHA standing case that involved
alleged harm to a local community was Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing &
Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), a decision that the Supreme Court
cited with approval in two of its FHA decisions in the 1970s. See Gladstone Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114 n.28 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). In Shannon, the Third Circuit upheld the standing of
local residents and businesses to challenge HUD’s decision to support a particular
subsidized housing project in their Philadelphia neighborhood in violation of HUD’s
duties under the FHA and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 436 F.2d at 815–17.
The plaintiffs alleged that locating this project “on the site chosen will have the effect
of increasing the already high concentration of low income black residents in the East
Poplar Urban Renewal Area.” Id. at 812. The Third Circuit upheld the plaintiffs’
standing based on their desire “to create a more stable and racially balanced environment,” id., and their allegation that “the concentration of lower income black residents
in [this] project in their neighborhood will adversely affect not only their investments
in homes and businesses, but even the very quality of their daily lives,” id. at 818.
According to Shannon, the choice of location of a given HUD-subsidized housing
project could have the effect of racial discrimination, an effect that “could arise by
virtue of the undue concentration of persons of a given race, or socio-economic group,
in a given neighborhood.” Id. at 820. This could “have the same potential for perpetuating racial segregation” as the by-gone de jure system of segregation that once existed in low-rent public housing. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that, based on
HUD’s affirmative duties under the FHA’s § 3608, the agency’s actions cannot ignore
the negative effects of heightened racial concentration on minority neighborhoods,
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Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,188 upheld standing for
tenants to sue their landlord for discriminating against minority applicants. The defendant, which owned a large apartment complex in San
Francisco with about 8200 residents,189 argued that only those it allegedly discriminated against could sue.190 The Court disagreed, holding
that the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently set forth “injury in fact . . . ;
the alleged injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons
from the apartment complex is the loss of important benefits from
interracial association.”191 According to the Trafficante opinion,
“[t]he person on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory housing practices; it is, as Senator Javits said in supporting the bill, ‘the whole community.’ ”192
A few years later in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,193 the Court held that Trafficante applied to residents of an area
whose racial make-up was allegedly being manipulated by the defendants’ illegal steering.194 The defendant-realtors in Gladstone allegedly directed black homeseekers to a particular “target area” in the
Village, a Chicago suburb, while directing similarly situated white
homeseekers to other towns.195 The individual plaintiffs in Gladstone
included four residents of this target area, who alleged that “the transformation of their neighborhood from an integrated to a predominantly
Negro community is depriving them of ‘the social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated society.’ ”196
The question then became “whether an allegation that this particular area is losing its integrated character because of [defendants’]
conduct is sufficient to satisfy [Article] III.”197 The defendants argued
that there was a critical distinction between the 8200-person complex
in Trafficante and the targeted 12-by-13-block neighborhood in Gladand thus the FHA requires HUD to consider the “relevant racial and socio-economic
information” before approving sites for federally subsidized housing. Id. at 821.
188. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
189. Id. at 206.
190. Id. at 208.
191. Id. at 209–10.
192. Id. at 211 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2706 (1968)).
193. 441 U.S. 91, 111–15 (1979).
194. Id. at 111. The individual plaintiffs in Gladstone “claimed to be injured as
homeowners in the community against which [defendants’] alleged steering has been
directed.” Id.
195. Id. at 111–13.
196. Id. at 111. According to the Court, the Gladstone plaintiffs’ allegations of injury to their “society” was “similar to that presented in Trafficante” and referred to
“the harm done to the residents of the carefully described neighborhood in Bellwood
in which four of the individual [plaintiffs’] reside.” Id. at 111–12.
197. Id. at 113.
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stone, in part because the “population of Bellwood, of which the target
neighborhood is only a part, was estimated at 20,969.”198 The Court
rejected this argument, concluding that “for the purpose of standing
analysis, we perceive no categorical distinction between injury from
racial steering suffered by occupants of a large apartment complex and
that imposed upon residents of a relatively compact neighborhood
such as Bellwood.”199 Thus, Gladstone held that the standing of the
local residents here “to protest the intentional segregation of their
community [does] not vary simply because that community is defined
in terms of city blocks rather than apartment buildings.”200 The Court
did, however, issue this caveat:
A “neighborhood” whose racial composition allegedly is being
manipulated may be so extensive in area, so heavily or even so
sparsely populated, or so lacking in shared social and commercial
intercourse that there would be no actual injury to a particular
resident.201

Still, according to Gladstone, the resolution of such issues was not
appropriate at the summary judgment stage, but should be based on
“discrete facts presented at trial.”202
In 1982, the Court decided another FHA standing case involving
local residents in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.203 Like Gladstone,
Havens upheld a challenge to defendants’ steering practices that allegedly deprived two of the individual plaintiffs of “the benefits that result from living in an integrated community.”204 These plaintiffs
alleged Gladstone-like injuries as “residents of the City of Richmond
or Henrico County.”205 The defendants sought to distinguish Gladstone by arguing that the plaintiffs here, “by pleading simply that they
were residents of the Richmond metropolitan area, have failed to
demonstrate how the asserted steering practices of [defendants] in
198. Id. at 113 n.27.
199. Id. at 114. The Gladstone opinion noted that the difference between the plaintiffs here and Trafficante’s apartment residents might actually favor the former:
“Apartment dwellers often are more mobile, with less attachment to a community as
such, and thus are able to react more quickly to perceived social or economic changes.
The homeowner in a suburban neighborhood such as Bellwood may well have deeper
community attachments and be less mobile.” Id. at 113–14.
200. Id. at 114.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Court added a footnote here, noting that the evidence at trial should also
cover the extent of the defendants’ business in the target area, because such evidence
would be “relevant to the establishment of the necessary causal connection between
the alleged conduct and the asserted injury.” Id. at 114 n.29.
203. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
204. Id. at 375.
205. Id. at 376.
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Henrico County may have affected the particular neighborhoods in
which the individual [plaintiffs] resided.”206 The Court responded:
It is indeed implausible to argue that [defendants’] alleged acts of
discrimination could have palpable effects throughout the entire
Richmond metropolitan area. At the time relevant to this action the
city of Richmond contained a population of nearly 220,000 persons, dispersed over 37 square miles. Henrico County occupied
more than 232 square miles, in which roughly 170,000 people
made their homes. Our cases have upheld standing based on the
effects of discrimination only within a “relatively compact neighborhood” [quoting Gladstone]. We have not suggested that discrimination within a single housing complex might give rise to
“distinct and palpable injury,” . . . throughout a metropolitan
area. . . . [Plaintiffs] have not identified the particular neighborhoods in which they lived, nor established the proximity of their
homes to the site of [defendants’] alleged steering practices.207

Still, the Havens opinion refused to say “as a matter of law that no
injury could be proved” nor that “[f]urther pleading and proof might
establish that they lived in areas where [defendants’] practices had an
appreciable effect.”208 Thus, the Court ordered that the plaintiffs be
given an opportunity on remand to amend their complaint to make the
necessary allegations to avoid dismissal.209
Taken together, Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens provide guidance on the size and type of area that might be appropriate for segregative-effect claims. Further, the fact that these cases involved
standing under the FHA is hardly an objection to their relevance here,
because the decisions essentially equated standing with a claim on the
merits.210 Thus, the Court’s determination that local residents and various other types of plaintiffs are entitled to challenge FHA-prohibited
action that is racially manipulating their neighborhood provides a
sense of how such a “community” should be defined for segregativeeffect claims.211
206. Id. at 377.
207. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 378.
210. As the Gladstone opinion put it, because standing exists “as long as the plaintiff
suffers actual injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct,” anyone may sue who is
“genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone’s rights” under the FHA. 441
U.S. 91, 103 n.9; see also Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303
(2017) (describing plaintiffs in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens as “hav[ing] a
cause of action under the FHA”).
211. In both Gladstone and Havens, various plaintiffs in addition to the local residents were held to have alleged sufficient injury by the defendants’ FHA violations
to have standing. See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 109–11 (upholding municipality’s stand-
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4. Non-Governmental Defendants and Non-Racial Claims
HUD’s discriminatory-effect regulation provides for FHA liability for any practice that has a segregative-effect because of race or
other prohibited factor and regardless of who engages in that practice.212 The cases upon which this theory is based, however, have all
been brought against municipal defendants and have all involved allegations of race or national origin discrimination.213 This raises the
possibility that segregative-effect claims against private defendants
and/or involving non-racial protected classes would be inappropriate
or at least subject to some limitations.
As for potential defendants, HUD’s view is that “[l]iability for a
practice that has an unjustified discriminatory effect may attach to either public or private parties.”214 Further, the Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights opined that segregative-effect claims may be asserted

ing); Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74, 378–79 (upholding standing of a tester and fair
housing organization). There have also been multiple types of plaintiffs in many of the
early segregative-effect cases. See, e.g., supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text
(describing Black Jack), text accompanying notes 44–45 (describing Arlington
Heights), text accompanying note 58 (describing Huntington). Because anyone who is
genuinely injured by a defendant’s FHA violation may sue, see supra note 210, the
point here is to focus on what conduct might be unlawful under the segregative-effect
theory, rather than who might bring such a claim.
212. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017) (providing liability for any practice that enhances segregated housing patterns “because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin”).
213. See supra Section I.C.
214. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013); see also id. at 11,470–71 (“The standards in [HUD’s discriminatory-effect regulation] apply equally to individuals, public
entities, and for-profit and nonprofit private entities because . . . neither the text of the
[FHA] nor its legislative history support drawing a distinction among them.”); id. at
11,463 (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 70,942 n.40) (2011)) (“discriminatory effects liability
applies to both public and private entities”). Lending support to this view, the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities indicated that its endorsement of FHA-impact
claims applied to private as well as public defendants. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. &
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (noting
that the “actors” subject to such claims included “[e]ntrepreneurs” and “private developers” as well as “[z]oning officials” and “housing authorities”).
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against private defendants, albeit in dicta.215 However, no such claim
has yet succeeded against a private defendant.216
Similarly, no case has endorsed the segregative-effect theory in a
successful claim of discrimination based on religion, sex, familial status, or disability. As noted above, two appellate decisions recently reviewed segregative-effect claims in cases that included allegations of
familial status and disability discrimination along with race and national origin claims.217 Those courts ultimately ruled against these
non-racial claims, but neither opinion suggested that such claims were
inappropriate per se.
The next section, which discusses possible future segregative-effect claims, includes consideration of such claims against non-governmental defendants and those involving non-racial discrimination.218
B. Future Applications of the Segregative-Effect Theory
1. Location of and Restrictions on Affordable Housing219
a. Exclusionary Zoning in White Areas
All successful segregative-effect cases thus far have involved
challenges to zoning or other actions by local governments that
215. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293
(7th Cir. 1977) (citing Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976)).
The Seventh Circuit’s citation to Smith for this proposition was dubious. The defendant in Smith was liable based solely on discriminatory intent, although the court did
opine that effect as well as intent claims are appropriate against private defendants
under the FHA. Smith, 536 F.2d at 234–36. Other decisions involving private housing
providers have recognized, at least in dicta, the FHA’s segregative-effect theory. See
Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations
Comm’n., 508 F.3d 366, 378 (6th Cir. 2007); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983, 987 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984). But see Brown v. Artery Org., 654 F. Supp 1106,
1115–16 (D.D.C. 1987) (opining, in the course of upholding FHA-intent claim challenging landlord’s conversion from low-rent to high-rent housing, that the FHA’s effect theory does not apply to private defendants).
216. Cf. supra Section II.A.3 (discussing three Supreme Court cases upholding
plaintiffs’ standing in claims alleging that private defendants’ FHA-based intentional
discrimination had segregative effects).
217. See Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F. App’x 42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussed supra notes
139–140 and accompanying text); Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs,
805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussed supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text);
see also Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522 (M.D. La.
1997) (district court ruled against segregative-effect claim based on familial status);
supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Summerchase).
218. See infra Section II.B.3–.5.
219. The term “affordable housing” here is used consistent with HUD’s commentary
to its discriminatory-effect regulation, which means that it includes government-subsidized housing and unsubsidized housing whose rental rates are modest. See, e.g., Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,476–77 (noting that “the discriminatory effects
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blocked affordable housing developments. These cases are what the
Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities described as the “heartland”
of FHA disparate-impact claims.220 Given the ease with which plaintiffs have shown segregative effect in exclusionary zoning cases,221
this type of claim seems likely to succeed at the prima facie case stage
and thus require justification by the defendant-municipality in Step
Two.222 This would be true even if a disparate-impact claim failed,
e.g., because the development would house a significant number of
white residents or the challenged action was a one-time decision rather
than a policy.223 Further, HUD’s new regime for enforcing the FHA’s
affirmative mandate in § 3608 for municipal and other recipients of
HUD funds suggests that defendants in exclusionary zoning cases
would have an even more difficult time in the future justifying their
opposition to affordable housing proposals.224
Still, it must be noted that only one modern exclusionary zoning
case has ruled in favor of a segregative-effect claim where a disparateimpact claim has failed.225 Even in early cases, the separate value of
the segregative-effect theory was unclear.226 Further, if the implications of the segregative-effect theory suggested in the previous paragraph become widely accepted, courts may require more proof that the
blocked development would substantially help integrate the area.227
In addition, the segregative-effect theory’s application to exclusionary zoning claims other than those based on race and national origin is untested.228 One example would be a zoning decision blocking a
method of proof has been used by plaintiffs seeking to develop such [affordable]
housing” and these cases show that “use of the discriminatory effects framework has
promoted the development of affordable housing”). For more on HUD’s view of the
meaning of “affordable housing,” see supra notes 108 and 119.
220. See supra text accompanying note 91.
221. See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing Arlington Heights);
Section II.A.1 (discussing policies versus one-time decisions).
224. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
225. See Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522 (M.D.
La. 1997) (discussed supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text and note 143); cf.
Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999), vacating 1997 WL
407250, at *6–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (vacating for inadequate findings an injunction
barring housing provider from amending its tenant-selection procedures to favor
working families based on district court’s determination that this change, though not
having a disparate impact on minorities, would cause a segregative effect at some of
defendant’s projects).
226. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text; see also supra Section
II.A.2.b.
228. See infra Section II.B.5.
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group home for disabled persons in a traditional single-family neighborhood. Based on the analogy to race in cases such as Arlington
Heights and Huntington, the plaintiff in such a disability case would
merely have to prove the chosen area has only a small percentage of
disabled people to make out a prima facie case. There has indeed been
much FHA litigation involving group homes, but the plaintiffs in these
cases, while often succeeding based on other theories, have rarely prevailed in their disparate-impact claims.229 This might change if plaintiffs articulate their discriminatory-effect claim in terms of segregative
effect rather than disparate impact.230
b. Municipal Attacks on Affordable Housing
In the years leading up to Inclusive Communities, the Supreme
Court twice granted certiorari to decide whether the FHA covered disparate-impact claims, but these cases were settled before the Court
could resolve the issue.231 Both cases accused municipalities of attacking affordable housing that was occupied primarily by minorities, and
both resulted in appellate decisions upholding disparate-impact claims
that did not mention the segregative-effect theory.
The first was Gallagher v. Magner,232 where landlords of lowincome properties challenged a city’s aggressive housing-code enforcement program that allegedly had both a racially discriminatory
purpose and effect. The district court granted summary judgment
against all of these claims, which the Eighth Circuit affirmed except
for the FHA-impact claim. This claim survived because the evidence
showed that the defendants’ aggressive code enforcement exacerbated
the city’s shortage of affordable housing, which was disproportionately occupied by racial minorities.233 Furthermore, while the defen229. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 11D:5 nn.20–22 and accompanying text.
Examples of failed impact claims by group homes include Quad Enterprises Co. v.
Town of Southold, 369 F. App’x 202, 205–07 (2d Cir. 2010), Schwartz v. City of
Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2008), Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment of Township of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466–68 (3d Cir.
2002), and Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306–07 (9th Cir. 1997).
230. See infra notes 335–336 and accompanying text (describing cases challenging
spacing requirements that forbid operation of a group home closer than a certain minimum distance from another such facility).
231. See Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (dismissing prior grant of certiorari of case in which the Court
had agreed to decide whether “disparate impact claims [are] cognizable under the Fair
Housing Act” after the parties settled); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012)
(same).
232. 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom Magner v. Gallagher,
132 S.Ct. 1306 (2012), and dismissed, 565 U.S. 1187 (2012).
233. Id. at 834–36.
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dants’ code enforcement was conceded to have “a manifest
relationship to legitimate, non-discriminatory objectives” (thereby satisfying their Step Two burden),234 the plaintiffs had identified an alternative approach that would achieve these objectives “while
maintaining a consistent supply of affordable housing.”235 Although
this case was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court, it was
clearly on the minds of the Justices when they decided Inclusive Communities. The principal dissent cited Magner with obvious contempt
for allowing a FHA-impact claim to challenge a municipality’s “efforts to combat ‘rodent infestation’ and other violations of the city’s
housing code.”236 Even the majority opinion, while endorsing the disparate-impact theory, suggested it might not apply in this situation.237
In the second, Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Township of Mount Holly,238 residents of a poor and deteriorating
neighborhood sought to stop the municipality from displacing them by
redeveloping the neighborhood with primarily upscale homes. Minorities accounted for eighty percent of the target neighborhood, which
thus had “the highest concentration of minority residents within
Mount Holly.”239 When the defendant began to acquire and demolish
many of the area’s homes, the plaintiffs brought claims alleging intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. The district court entered
summary judgment against all of these claims.240 However, the Third
Circuit, while affirming the intent ruling,241 held that the plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA.242
The appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that its redevelopment plan could not violate the FHA unless it increased segregation,
holding that disparate impact and segregative effect are alternative
ways of establishing a FHA violation.243 The parties agreed that the
defendant’s goal of alleviating blight and unsafe conditions was a le234. Id. at 837.
235. Id. at 838.
236. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 2524 (noting that “Magner was decided without the cautionary standards announced in this opinion and, in all events, the case was settled by the parties
before an ultimate determination of disparate-impact liability”); see also id. at 2523
(opining that it would be “paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs
on actors who encourage revitalizing dilapidated housing in our Nation’s cities merely
because some other priority might seem preferable”).
238. 658 F.3d 375, 377–81 (3d Cir. 2011).
239. Id. at 378.
240. See id. at 380–81.
241. Id. at 387.
242. Id. at 382–85.
243. Id. at 385.
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gitimate interest sufficient to satisfy its burden in Step Two.244 Thus,
the case on remand would turn on Step Three, i.e., whether the plaintiffs could prove that these conditions “could be remedied in a far less
heavy-handed manner that would not entail the wholesale destruction
and rebuilding of the neighborhood.”245
In an article cited in Inclusive Communities,246 Professor Seicshnaydre noted that Magner and Mount Holly were rare disparateimpact wins among FHA cases that challenged municipal efforts to
improve housing through heightened code enforcement or redevelopment.247 In any event, neither case involved a segregative-effect claim.
In fact, the defendants’ actions in those cases, by attacking housing
that was disproportionately occupied by minorities, might be seen as
reducing segregation by causing the dispersal of impacted minority
families throughout the relevant communities.248
In some situations, however, municipal efforts to “improve” minority areas can reinforce segregation. One example from the 1990s is
244. Id. For a description of Step Two of a discriminatory-effect case, see supra note
13 and accompanying text.
245. 658 F.3d at 386. For a description of Step Three of a discriminatory-effect case,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
The D.C. Circuit had earlier dealt with a situation similar to Magner and Mount
Holly in 2922 Sherman Avenue Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673
(D.C. Cir. 2006). There, residents of a poor Hispanic neighborhood accused the local
government of violating the FHA by aggressively enforcing its housing code against
their apartment buildings in order to shut them down and gentrify the area. The D.C.
Circuit found enough evidence to support the plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination
claim, noting that the defendant, having originally identified seventy-five buildings
distributed evenly throughout the city for aggressive code enforcement, ultimately
targeted only twenty-seven buildings located in neighborhoods with high Hispanic
populations. Id. at 682. The disparate-impact claim failed, however, because the plaintiffs showed only that the defendant’s code-enforcement policy impacted buildings in
predominantly Hispanic areas but did not provide the demographics of the specific
buildings harmed by that policy. Id. at 681. The opinion did not include any discussion of the FHA’s segregative-effect theory.
246. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
247. See Stacy Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63
AM. U. L. REV. 357, 403–08, 432–433 (2013). Examples of appellate decisions ruling
against such claims include Scopellitti v. City of Tampa, 677 F. App’x 503, 507–08
(11th Cir. 2017) and 2922 Sherman Avenue Tenants’ Ass’n, 444 F.3d at 673 (discussed supra note 245).
248. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Professor Seicshnaydre calls these
“housing improvement” cases and notes: “A housing improvement plan may have an
adverse impact on a community of color in the immediate aftermath of its adoption
and implementation, but over time it may have the effect of increasing housing opportunity and reducing segregation.” Seicshnaydre, supra note 247, at 407.
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Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison,249 in
which a Chicago suburb allegedly targeted its redevelopment efforts at
two heavily Hispanic neighborhoods.250 Local residents and other
plaintiffs, supported by the Justice Department, claimed that the resulting displacements would significantly decrease the number of Hispanics living in the Village, resulting in “the loss of social and
professional benefits gained from an integrated community.”251 The
consolidated lawsuits, which included claims of intentional discrimination, disparate impact, and segregative effect,252 were settled just
prior to trial.253 In approving the settlement, the district court found
that the Village’s redevelopment activities may have had a disparate
impact on Hispanics254 and also that these activities “could have had
the secondary consequence of increasing segregation” by displacing a
large percentage of the Village’s Hispanic population which, given the
absence of any relocation assistance, created “a danger of forcing
large numbers of Hispanics to relocate outside the Village.”255
More recently, in City of Joliet v. New West, L.P.,256 the Seventh
Circuit, in 2016, ruled against a FHA-impact claim without considering the segregative-effect theory. This case involved Joliet’s efforts to
condemn a heavily black, low-income housing complex. The complex’s owner argued, unsuccessfully, that razing it would violate the
FHA because of racial intent or disparate impact. The trial judge ruled
against these claims, finding no disparate impact on the facts257 and
noting, with respect to Joliet’s intent, that the City had agreed “to create at least 115 new low-income housing units and provide housing
vouchers for all remaining [complex] residents.”258 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but gave different reasons for rejecting the impact
claim. The appellate court held that this claim failed because the defendant’s tenants would not be injured by having to move to better
housing and also because the project’s condemnation was a one-time
249. 958 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1997) and 988 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
250. See 988 F. Supp. at 1136–44 (describing the relevant facts). The Village’s population prior to its redevelopment activities was 32,058, 13.4% of whom were Hispanics, and, although Hispanics lived throughout the Village, they were heavily
concentrated in the two targeted neighborhoods. Id. at 1136–37.
251. 958 F. Supp. at 1328.
252. See 988 F. Supp. at 1150.
253. See id. at 1136.
254. Id. at 1155.
255. Id. at 1155 n.16.
256. 825 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Mid-City Nat. Bank of Chi.
v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 518 (Nov. 28, 2016) (No. 16-485).
257. See id. at 830.
258. Id. at 829.
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decision by the City and thus could not be challenged as a policy
under the disparate-impact theory.259
The Joliet case, which began years before HUD issued its 2013
discriminatory-effect regulation, seems to be a strong candidate for a
segregative-effect claim. The condemned complex was in a white
area,260 and its black residents, even if they were ultimately able to
secure other housing in Joliet, seemed likely to end up in heavily black
areas.261 Further, as noted above, one-time acts can be challenged
under the segregative-effect theory.262 But the owners in Joliet did not
make such a claim, and the Seventh Circuit did not mention this
theory.263
The cases discussed in this section are reminiscent of those involving “urban renewal” in the 1960s and 1970s.264 Those cases usu259. Id. at 828. See supra note 146 and accompanying text for a description of this
requirement of the disparate-impact theory.
260. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Mid-City Nat’l Bank v. City of Joliet,
137 S. Ct. 518 (2016) (No. 16-485), 2016 WL 5956657 [hereinafter Joliet Petition]
(describing the complex’s 800 residents as being ninety percent African-American
and Joliet as being racially divided with west of the Des Plaines River (where the
complex was located) being sixty-seven percent white and six percent African-American and east of the river being predominantly African-American and Hispanic).
261. See, e.g., Complaint at 12, United States v. City of Joliet, No. 11-cv-5305 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 4, 2011) (alleging that the City’s actions would violate the FHA both by
having “a disproportionate adverse impact on African-Americans and operat[ing] to
perpetuate segregation in Joliet”). This claim by the United States was settled in 2013.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and HUD Settle Discrimination Claims Against the City of Joliet, Ill. (Nov. 12, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-hud-settle-discrimination-claimsagainst-city-joliet-ill.
262. See supra Section II.A.1.
263. In a separate action, the United States did allege both segregative-effect and
disparate-impact claims, but this action was settled in 2013. See supra note 261. As
for the private owners’ claim that went to trial, the owners did argue that the displaced
residents would not be able to find housing elsewhere in Joliet. See Joliet Petition,
supra note 260, at 4 (noting that the private-owner plaintiffs “presented evidence of
the absence of alternative affordable housing in Joliet and . . . contended that the
residents of the Property [complex] would find it improbable, if not impossible, to
find suitable alternative housing in nearby communities”). However, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the trial judge’s contrary finding, noting that “Joliet had a population of
148,000 at the 2010 census, and a city of that size should not have difficulty finding
room for the 240 or so [displaced] families with housing vouchers. . . . [T]he population of Joliet Township is about a quarter black. . . . Only a small fraction of the black
population is affected by the closure of the [complex], which implies that space elsewhere will be available.” 825 F.3d at 829. But the question in a segregative-effect
case is not if, but where, other housing will be available; if the answer is primarily in
minority neighborhoods, then the condemnation of a heavily black complex in a white
area certainly could be challenged for increasing segregation in the city.
264. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 131–33 (3d Cir. 1977)
(describing how urban renewal took blacks out of an integrated area in Philadelphia
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ally involved constitutional claims by displaced minorities that
required proof of racial intent, but the modern era has allowed FHAeffect claims as well. The modern cases have generally focused on
FHA disparate-impact claims, most of which—other than Magner and
Mount Holly—have failed. As Hispanics United and Joliet suggest,
however, even if a disparate-impact claim fails in such a case, a segregative-effect claim may be viable, at least where the defendant’s
“housing improvement” activities result in dispersal of minority families without the benefit of a relocation program in the relevant
jurisdiction.
c.

Locating Affordable Housing in Heavily Minority Areas

The “reverse” of a municipality’s exclusion of affordable housing
is to approve such housing in a poor area that already has a disproportionate number of minority residents, thus perpetuating segregation.265
In 1970, the Third Circuit produced a strong condemnation of this
type of action in Shannon v. HUD.266 However, few cases in recent
times have raised FHA-challenges to housing-project approvals.267
The most important case in modern times is Inclusive Communities, where a state agency was accused of approving housing proposals
under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in a
way that resulted in most Dallas-area projects being located in poor
inner-city neighborhoods as opposed to white suburban communities.268 The trial court found against the plaintiff’s intent-based claims,
but ruled in favor of the FHA disparate-impact claim.269 The latter
and turned it into all-white one, as background for finding intentional discrimination
here); see also id. at 146–50 (affirming plaintiffs’ judgment based on both disparateimpact and segregative-effect grounds).
265. A similar result may occur when other subsidized housing opportunities, such
as Section 8 vouchers, are used in such areas. For more on the Section 8 program and
the FHA’s segregative-effect theory of liability, see infra Section II.B.4.a.
266. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (discussed supra note 187).
267. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1219 (2d Cir. 1987)
(commenting that “once a municipality has decided to construct housing, [it may not]
lawfully proceed with segregative intent and effect to confine housing for minority
occupancy to areas in which minority residence is already concentrated, thereby enhancing and perpetuating racial segregation in residential patterns”); Metz v. Herbert,
243 F. Supp. 3d 929, 937–38 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (dismissing FHA-based challenge to
defendant’s approval of affordable housing project that allegedly would perpetuate
segregation in plaintiffs’ neighborhood); supra note 175 (describing HUD charge
against Houston, Texas).
268. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2513–14 (2015).
269. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860
F. Supp. 2d 312, 318–31 (N.D. Tex. 2012). In a prior opinion ruling that the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the court relied on evidence
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ruling was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, which held that
disparate-impact claims were cognizable under the FHA, but expressed skepticism about this particular claim.270
The Court’s opinion noted two difficulties with the plaintiff’s
claim. First, it suggested that deciding where to locate a particular
housing project might be a one-time decision rather than a “policy.”271
The second problem was causation: A plaintiff’s challenge to a new
development “in one location rather than another will not easily be
able to show that this is a policy causing a disparate impact [in part]
because of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about
where to construct or renovate housing units.”272 On remand, the trial
court took the hint and ruled against the plaintiff’s disparate-impact
claim, both because the court concluded that no “policy” was involved
and because of a lack of causation.273
These problems would be far less daunting in a segregative-effect
claim. First, segregative-effect claims, unlike those based on disparate
impact, can challenge one-time decisions.274 Second, segregative-effect claims have required much less in the way of proof of a causal
connection between the defendant’s action and continuing segregation; to date, the cases have only demanded that a segregative-effect
plaintiff show that the defendant blocked an integrated housing propo-

showing that, “from 1999–2008, [defendant] approved tax credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 9.9% Caucasian areas, but only approved 37.4% of
proposed non-elderly units in 90% to 100% Caucasian areas.” Id. at 322 (quoting
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs (ICP II), 749 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 499 (2010)). The court also found that “92.29% of [LIHTC] units in the
city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian residents.”
See 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (quoting ICP II, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 499).
270. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–25.
271. Id. at 2523 (noting that a “one-time decision may not be a policy at all” for
disparate-impact purposes).
272. Id. at 2523–24. The Inclusive Communities opinion also questioned whether a
causal connection could be shown between the defendant’s action here and a disparate
impact, because, for instance, “federal law substantially limits the [defendant’s] discretion.” Id. at 2524.
273. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No.
3:08-CV-0546D, 2016 WL 4494322, at *6–12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). In a related
case decided shortly thereafter, the same judge upheld plaintiff’s intent-based claims
accusing the federal authorities administering the LIHTC program of also concentrating such projects in the Dallas area in poor and minority areas, but dismissed their
FHA-impact claim for failing to identify a proper policy to challenge and lack of
causation without separately considering a segregative-effect theory under the FHA.
See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 3:14-CV-3013D,
2016 WL 6397643, at *8–14 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2016).
274. See supra Section II.A.1.
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sal in a white area or fostered such a proposal in a minority area.275 If
this remains true, the segregative-effect theory would provide a more
robust tool than disparate-impact claims for challenging decisions to
locate subsidized housing in poor inner-city areas.
2.

Residency Preferences

Housing restrictions that discriminate in favor of local residents
have long been the target of FHA litigation. In 1980, a housing authority’s use of such a preference in an all-white suburb of Mobile, Alabama was struck down based on its racial effect,276 despite no finding
of intentional discrimination.277 Local preferences imposed by
predominantly white communities in racially diverse areas virtually
invite FHA-effect claims. Some of these cases have relied on the disparate-impact theory,278 but the segregative-effect theory seems an
even stronger basis for these claims. Obviously, a preference for local
residents in an all-white area would have the effect of maintaining
segregation.279
275. See notes 163–169 and accompanying text; Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (described supra note 1867).
276. United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 729–32 (S.D.
Ala. 1980). In reaching this conclusion, the court relied both on the disparate-impact
and segregative-effect theories. See id. at 730 (finding both that defendant’s application of “the residency requirement to applicants seeking housing certainly had a
greater adverse impact on Negroes as against Caucasians” and that its decision “to
adopt and enforce the residency requirement worked to perpetuate the segregation of
the Chickasaw community”).
277. Id. at 727–29. Intent-based FHA challenges to local residency requirements
have been upheld in other cases. See, e.g., Winfield v. City of New York, No.
15CV5236-LTS-DCF, 2016 WL 6208564, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016); United
States v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 F. Supp. 3d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Fair Hous. Justice
Ctr. v. Edgewater Park Owners Coop., Inc., No. 10 CV 912(RPP), 2012 WL 762323,
at *7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012).
278. See, e.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 56–64 (D.
Mass. 2002); cf. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par., 648
F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding that defendant’s “blood relative” ordinance
that limited rentals to landlords’ close family members violated FHA-based consent
decree both because of its disparate racial impact and its discriminatory intent); Complaint, Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Bedford, No. 7:17-cv-05664 (S.D.N.Y.
July 26, 2017) (alleging that heavily white Town’s preferences for local residents and
workers for its affordable housing would have an adverse impact on African Americans in violation of the FHA).
279. See Winfield, 2016 WL 6208564, at *6 (“There is an obvious causal link between a policy whose very purpose is to maintain the existing racial and ethnic
makeup of local communities and the corresponding perpetuation of the racial and
ethnic makeup of those communities.”); see also J. David Goodman, City to Settle
Discrimination Claim in Brooklyn Housing Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/nyregion/brooklyn-housing-discrimination.html (reporting on the settlement of a FHA case in which the trial court had issued a prelimi-
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Though most of these cases have been brought against municipal
defendants, the theory would also apply to private defendants, such as
a co-op that requires new buyers to have references from current residents.280 Landlords and other housing providers that rely exclusively
on word-of-mouth to advertise their units might also be targets of such
a claim.281
Regardless of the type of defendant, a plaintiff’s prima facie case
would only require proof that, in a housing market with substantial
minorities, a local preference is being employed in a predominantly
white building or community.282 Once this is shown, the local preference could survive only if the defendant can provide a legitimate justification for it,283 and then only if the plaintiff cannot identify a less
discriminatory alternative.284
3. Steering
Racial steering has long been the target of FHA suits,285 and it
remains a major form of housing discrimination and cause of residennarily injunction against New York City after finding that its local-resident-preference
system in a predominantly white community “will perpetuate segregation” in the area
and thus was likely to violate the FHA (quoting Broadway Triangle Cmty. Coalition
v. Bloomberg, 941 N.Y.S.2d 831, 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011))); cf. Langlois, 234 F.
Supp. 2d at 62 (noting, in ruling against local preferences by Boston-area suburbs, that
there is an “overarching intuitive principle here: where a community has a smaller
proportion of minority residents than does the larger geographical area from which it
draws applicants, a selection process that favors its residents cannot but work a disparate impact on minorities”).
280. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Justice Ctr., 2012 WL 762323, at *10–11.
281. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1979)
(citing numerous FHA cases for the proposition that a requirement that an applicant
be compatible with the current neighbors may be used to mask racial discrimination);
cf. William M. Wiecek & Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Confronting Structural Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (2014)
(noting that “[r]ecruiting new workers via word-of-mouth through friends and friendsof-friends has a racial impact . . . [b]ecause whites and blacks live in largely segregated neighborhoods and move in different social circles”).
282. See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 69, 70 n.41 (holding inadequate defendants’ proffered justification for their residency preferences and opining that a legitimate justification in such a case would require “a record of local conditions and needs
that suggests why the residency preferences are necessary [giving examples]”);
Broadway Triangle Cmty. Coalition, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (“The Defendants have not
demonstrated that their policies and actions are furthered by legitimate interests,
which cannot be satisfied by lesser, non-discriminatory alternatives.”).
284. See, e.g., Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (suggesting that plaintiffs’ proposals
for modifying the challenged residency preferences here would satisfy their Step
Three burden).
285. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 13:5. FHA decisions condemning racial
steering date back to the early 1970s. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d
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tial segregation.286 In 1982, the Supreme Court described racial steering as a “practice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve and
encourage patterns of racial segregation in available housing by steering members of racial and ethnic groups to buildings occupied primarily by members of such racial and ethnic groups and away from
buildings and neighborhoods inhabited primarily by members of other
races or groups.”287 In addition to realtors, steering claims have been
brought against housing developers and large landlords who allegedly
directed whites and blacks to different units within their control.288
Racially motivated steering makes housing unavailable in violation of the FHA’s § 3604(a).289 However, in an influential 1990 decision by the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner suggested that the FHA
condemns only intent-based steering.290 Given that both the Supreme
Court and HUD have described steering as a practice that perpetuates
segregated housing patterns,291 Judge Posners’s theory seems unduly
restrictive.
438, 441–42 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir.
1973).
286. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012, at xi
(2013) (finding, based on HUD-sponsored national housing discrimination study covering twenty-eight metropolitan areas, that minority homeseekers are still often “told
about and shown fewer homes and apartments than [comparable] whites”); id. at xvii
(“Whites are significantly more likely than blacks or Asians to be shown . . . neighborhoods with higher percentages of whites”); id. at 55 (“[W]hites hear more positive
comments about white neighborhoods and more negative comments about minority
neighborhoods than do blacks, potentially steering them away from mixed or minority
neighborhoods.”).
287. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982). The Havens
case is discussed supra notes 203–209 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978).
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2015); SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 13:5 n.6 (collecting cases). Steering may also violate other provisions of the FHA. See id. at § 14:2
nn. 18–20 and accompanying text (dealing with steering claims under the FHA’s
§ 3604(b)).
290. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529–34 (7th Cir. 1990). According to Judge Posner, the question in this case was whether § 3604(a) “forbids
unintentional racial steering—more aptly, perhaps, whether there is such an animal.”
Id. at 1529. The answer he gave was “no,” with the opinion concluding that “we
cannot imagine the practice (innocent in intent, discriminatory in impact [citing
Griggs]), on which a disparate impact theory might be based in this case” and that
here “discriminatory effect is not . . . the violation; it is merely evidence of violation.”
Id. at 1533–34.
291. See supra text accompanying note 287 (quoting the Supreme Court in Havens);
see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (2017) (HUD regulation). This HUD regulation makes
it unlawful, on the basis of race or any other prohibited ground,
to restrict or attempt to restrict the choices of a person by word or conduct
in connection with seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling
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For Judge Posner, a realtor would not be liable if he merely acquiesces in his customers’ preferences; that is, he shows whites who
prefer majority-white areas only houses in those areas and blacks who
prefer integrated areas only houses in those areas.292 But surely this
practice—as opposed to showing all prospects both areas—would
have the effect of reinforcing/perpetuating racial segregation, regardless of the salesperson’s “innocent” intent. Indeed, it was this very
behavior that the Supreme Court held in Gladstone and Havens could
be challenged by local residents, because the defendants’ practices allegedly had the harmful effect of segregating their communities.293
As with any segregative-effect claim, there may be a “how
much” issue in a steering claim based on this theory—for example,
did the defendant do enough steering to have an appreciable effect on
segregation in the area?294 However, the theory itself seems sound for
this type of case. Further, HUD’s anti-steering regulation reduces concerns about this issue, because it explicitly applies to actions that
“tend to perpetuate” segregated housing patterns, not only actions that
actually perpetuate such patterns.295
4. Other Race-Based Examples
a. Section 8
The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV or Section 8) program is
HUD’s largest subsidy program, serving some 2.2 million low-income
households.296 Individuals who meet income-eligibility requirements
obtain vouchers from their local public housing agency (PHA) that are
used to secure private housing within or even beyond the PHA’s juris-

so as to perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, segregated housing patterns, or
to discourage or obstruct choices in a community, neighborhood or
development.
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a).
292. See Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1529–34.
293. See supra notes 193–209 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Section II.A.2.b; supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
295. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (quoted supra note 291).
296. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD’S PROPOSED 2017 BUDGET:
FACT SHEET (2017), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PROPOSEDFY17FACT
SHEET.PDF.
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diction (i.e., vouchers are “portable”).297 Nationwide, voucher users
are disproportionately minorities, with almost half being black.298
From the program’s inception, many landlords have refused to
deal with HCV holders. Their “No Section 8” policies have been the
target of a number of FHA-based impact challenges,299 most of which
have not succeeded.300 But a segregative-effect challenge might be
more likely to be successful; indeed, it would seem that a segregativeeffect prima facie case could be made against any landlord employing
such a policy in either a large apartment complex or neighborhood if
the complex or neighborhood is predominantly white and the voucher
holders in the area include a substantial percentage of minorities.301
b. Individual Refusals to Sell or Rent
Assume that a subdivision developer, landlord, or other housing
provider rejects a minority applicant, resulting in a FHA intent-based
suit accusing the provider of refusing to sell or rent because of the
applicant’s race. Without direct evidence of the defendant’s illegal
motive, the plaintiff could succeed only via the prima-facie-case approach, in which the plaintiff has the burden of proving, inter alia, that
297. See Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (first
citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437(r)(1), and then citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.353(b)); Housing
Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., https://
www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 (last visited Nov.
17, 2017).
298. See Assisted Housing: National and Local, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., http://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture/yearlydata.html ( using the
Query Tool, search “2016 Based on 2010 Census”; “U.S. Total”; “Housing Choice
Vouchers”; and “%” of the desired ethnicity) (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (reporting
that in 2016, forty-eight percent of voucher holders were black and seventeen percent
were Hispanic). However, the racial/ethnic distribution of voucher holders varies considerably across the country. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICES VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANT AND NEIGHBORHOOD WELFARE app. B-1 at 101 (2003) (“Appendix B-1: Age and Race/Ethnicity of the HCV Population in Each of the 50 Largest
MSAs”).
299. See, e.g., Wadley v. Park at Landmark, L.P., 264 F. App’x 279 (4th Cir. 2008);
Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2007); see also L.C. v. Lefrak Org., 987 F.
Supp. 2d 391, 403–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging “No Section 8” policy based on
both FHA-impact claim and supplemental claim based on state law banning sourceof-income discrimination).
300. See, e.g., Graoch Assocs. #33, 508 F.3d at 377–79; Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., No. 3:17-CV-206-K, 2017 WL 2984048, at *8–12 (N.D.
Tex. July 13, 2017); Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394,
412–14 (Mass. 2016).
301. See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
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the defendant’s claimed legitimate reason for its action is false (i.e., is
a pretext for discrimination).302
Now assume that the defendant’s housing is located in a community whose residents are over ninety-five percent white. Would this
added fact allow the plaintiff to assert, along with the intent claim, a
segregative-effect claim on the theory that the defendant’s rejection of
the minority homeseeker reinforces or perpetuates segregated housing
patterns in this area?303
If so, the addition of the segregative-effect claim could be significant. In both claims, once a prima facie case is established, the issue
becomes whether the defendant had a legitimate reason for its action.
However, the defendant’s burden of proof on this issue is greater in
the effect claim. In the intent claim, the defendant’s burden is simply
one of production,304 whereas it is a full burden of persuasion in the
effect claim.305 In other words, if the fact-finder cannot decide
whether to believe the defendant, the defendant will prevail in the intent claim but lose in the effect claim. Further, even if the fact-finder
believes the defendant on this point, the plaintiff may still prevail in
the effect claim by showing a less discriminatory alternative (e.g., that
the minority applicant could be accepted, but with conditions to ameliorate the defendant’s legitimate concerns over, say, the applicant’s
ability to pay).
Could the segregative-effect theory increase the chances of success for intent-based FHA cases in racially segregated communities?
The only apparent difficulty at the prima-facie-case stage would be
showing that the defendant’s action caused a substantial effect on local segregation, i.e., satisfying the “how much” element.306 True, the
foundation cases for this theory—Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and
Huntington—involved blocked developments that would have added a
group of minority families to all-white communities, but their opinions suggest that virtually any number of new black families would
suffice to help desegregate the area.307 In order to deal with the problem posed in this section, courts will have to give more attention to
302. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 10:2 (discussing the parties’ respective burdens of proof in such a case).
303. The same issue would presumably be presented if the racial situation were reversed, i.e., the defendant rejects a white homeseeker’s application in a predominantly
black community.
304. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 10:2 nn. 16–20 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Section II.A.2.b.
307. See supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text.
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defining “how much” is required to establish a prima facie case of
segregative effect.
5.

Cases Involving Other Protected Classes

The FHA outlaws discrimination on the basis of seven factors:
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and disability.308 All reported segregative-effect cases thus far have been based
on race, color, or national origin, although one has also included a
disability claim and two others a familial status claim.309
While the segregative-effect theory applies to all protected classes,310 a prerequisite for a successful claim is that the relevant area is
already highly segregated, e.g., in a race claim, the local population is
overwhelmingly white.311 This fact presumably would not be present
in most familial status and sex-based claims. On the other hand, disability claims on behalf of group homes seeking to locate in traditional
single-family neighborhoods would likely succeed, as the proposed
home would add more disabled residents to an area that presumably
has only a few. Thus, the segregative-effect theory could add another
weapon to the FHA arsenal used by group homes, which, although
having often succeeded in intent and reasonable accommodation
claims, have rarely prevailed on the disparate-impact theory.312 By
contrast, group homes designed to house needy children or women
would face a difficult task of proving this prerequisite for a segregative-effect claim.313
Religion-based cases may be possible in some areas. For example, Orthodox Jews have brought a number of FHA intent-based
308. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–06 & 3617 (2015).
309. See Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F. App’x 42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (disability); Anderson
Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015) (familial status);
Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522 (M.D. La. 1997)
(familial status). All three were unsuccessful.
310. See supra note 17 (quoting HUD regulation).
311. See supra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
313. There are several cases in which such group homes have brought FHA-based
challenges to adverse municipal actions. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d
315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant’s zoning ordinance blocking proposed
temporary shelter for abused women was not shown to have a discriminatory impact
on women); Children’s All. v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491, 1495–1501 (W.D.
Wash. 1997) (striking down defendant’s restrictions on group home for troubled youth
on both familial status and disability grounds); cf. Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise,
490 F.3d 1041, 1048–52 (9th Cir. 2007) (ordering preliminary injunction under the
FHA for homeless shelter’s women and families-with-children residents who were
displaced when defendant adopted a men-only policy for that shelter). None of these
cases presented a segregative-effect claim.
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claims against New York suburbs challenging actions that allegedly
discouraged people with similar religious beliefs from moving into
those communities.314 It is not hard to envision similar claims on behalf of Muslims in various parts of the country.315 A segregative-effect claim in such a case would allow the plaintiff to prevail without
having to prove intentional discrimination, but, as noted in the previous paragraph, the viability of such a claim would require proof that
the particular community has a low percentage of residents that observe the targeted religion.316
6. Other Issues
a. Can Segregative-Effect Be Used as a Defense?
Plaintiffs in discriminatory-effect cases must show that the defendant’s challenged action has either a disparate impact on a protected
class, a segregative effect in the local community, or both. Past cases
and HUD’s discriminatory-effect regulation view these two theories as
complementing each other and providing alternative methods for establishing liability.317 However, what if the theories conflict in a particular situation? Specifically, could a defendant whose policy is
shown to disproportionately harm a protected class prevail in Step
Two of an impact case on the ground that this policy reduces
segregation?
314. See, e.g., LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 1995);
Bloomingburg Jewish Educ. Ctr. v. Village of Bloomingburg, 111 F. Supp. 3d 459,
489–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village
of Pomona, 915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 607–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim
Radin, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees ex rel. Village of New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347,
354–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309
F.3d 144, 157 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002) (implying, in rejecting on standing grounds FHA
claim by local residents that defendant’s removal of Jewish religious items from its
utility poles “discourage[d] Orthodox Jews from moving into town,” that such a claim
by outsiders might be upheld); Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley
Hills, 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing, after upholding various
other claims, FHA claims against certain defendants whose opposition to religious
center proposed by Orthodox Jews was held to be protected speech).
315. Cf. United States v. Bensalem Township, 220 F. Supp. 3d 615, 620–23 (E.D.
Pa. 2016) (upholding complaint under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act accusing defendant of religious discrimination in denying zoning approval for mosque).
316. Cf. Bloomingburg Jewish Educ. Ctr., 111 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (noting that the
defendant-village has only four hundred residents and that “[o]ver the past several
years, Hasidic Jews have been moving into the village in increasing numbers”).
317. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2017) (HUD regulation); supra notes 37–38 and
accompanying text (Black Jack); supra note 49 and accompanying text (Arlington
Heights); supra note 60 and accompanying text (Huntington).
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Hints of this possibility do exist. For example, the HUD regulation, by explicitly providing that a defendant can show in Step Two
that its challenged practice “is supported by a legally sufficient justification . . . [but this] may not be used as a defense against a claim of
intentional discrimination,”318 implies that such a showing might be
used to defend other types of FHA claims. Another example is the
Second Circuit’s 1973 decision in Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority,319 which allowed the defendant-Authority to ignore a tenant-placement plan preferring certain displaced former residents for
two new projects in favor of a more integrative solution. In Otero, the
fact that minorities accounted for most of the displaced residents favored by the original plan led the lower court to rule in their favor, but
the Second Circuit disagreed. It noted that following that plan would
result in the new buildings being eighty percent minority and twenty
percent white,320 which would conflict with the Authority’s FHA-imposed duty to integrate its housing.321 This duty bars public housing
officials from making decisions “having the long range effect of increasing or maintaining racially segregated housing patterns merely
because minority groups will gain an immediate benefit.”322 According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he purpose of racial integration is to
benefit the community as a whole, not just certain of its members.”323
These hints, however, have not yet resulted in a successful defense to a FHA-impact claim. As noted above, the Third Circuit in
2011 in the Mount Holly case rejected a defendant’s argument that its
redevelopment plan could not run afoul of the disparate-impact theory
unless it increased segregation in the community.324 Decades earlier in
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates,325 the Fourth Circuit also upheld a
FHA-impact claim against a private landlord, rejecting the defendant’s
318. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d).
319. 484 F.2d 1122, 1136–38 (2d Cir. 1973).
320. Id. at 1132.
321. Id. at 1132–33. The statutory basis for the Authority’s duty to integrate was,
according to the Second Circuit, the FHA’s § 3608, which requires HUD grantees to
affirmatively further fair housing and which thus mandates that “consideration be
given to the impact of proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration
in the area in which the proposed housing is to be built.” Id. at 1134 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608, which is discussed supra note 175 and its accompanying text). According to
Otero, § 3608 meant that the Authority has “an obligation to act affirmatively to
achieve integration in housing.” Id. at 1133.
322. Id. at 1134.
323. Id. The relevant “community” in Otero was assumed to be “the area delineated
as the Lower East Side” of Manhattan. Id. at 1132 n.13.
324. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
325. 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that, for minority plaintiffs to prevail in a FHA-impact claim, they are “required to prove only that a given policy had a
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argument that its challenged policy did not add to segregation in the
area. In 2016, a D.C. district court, citing Betsey and Title VII precedents like Connecticut v. Teal,326 agreed that the defendant-landlords’
policies of not renting to people with criminal records could be challenged for having a disparate impact on blacks even if minorities already occupied most of the defendants’ units.327
One can agree with these decisions without fully ruling out a
“pro-integration” defense to FHA-impact claims. For one thing, the
decisions are generally based on the Supreme Court’s rejection of a
“bottom line” defense in Title VII impact cases, but Title VII precedents are not entirely persuasive here because, as noted above, the
FHA’s segregative-effect theory has no analogous counterpart in Title
VII law.328 Further, even if Betsey, Mount Holly, and other FHA cases
are correct that a plaintiff’s impact-proof in Step One is not to be
discounted via a “bottom line” analysis, a defendant might still argue
that its challenged policy satisfies Step Two by promoting integration.
This was not attempted in any of the cases discussed in the previous
paragraph, all of which focused on the plaintiff’s Step One proof.
Those that mentioned the defendant’s Step Two burden looked at
other justifications, e.g., rehabilitating a blighted neighborhood in
Mount Holly.329
Consider the case of a defendant-landlord with a “No Criminal
Record” policy and an overwhelmingly black clientele that tries to
discriminatory impact on them as individuals” and not also that the policy added to
segregation of their group).
326. 457 U.S. 440, 452–56 (1982) (rejecting as a defense to a Title VII impact claim
situations where an employer has compensated for a discriminatory test “by hiring or
promoting a sufficient number of black employees to reach a nondiscriminatory ‘bottom line’”); see also Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (“A
racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific
acts of discrimination.”).
327. Alexander v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., No. 15-01140 (RCL), 2016 WL
5957673, at *3 (D.D.C. July 22, 2016). According to the Alexander opinion, “[t]he
logic of the ‘bottom line’ argument is pernicious. If the Court were to find there could
be no disparate impact as a matter of law so long as defendants could show a sufficient baseline [of minority residents], it could justify discrimination against some portions of a class so long as other members were treated favorably.” Id.
In another 2016 case challenging a landlord’s “No Criminal Record” policy, the
Justice Department advocated against the defendant’s position that its complex’s predominately black and Hispanic population precluded liability. See Statement of Interest of United States of America at 11–12, Fortune Soc’y, Inc. v. Sandcastle Towers
Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. CV-14-6410 (VMS) (S.D.N.Y Oct. 18, 2016), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/file/903681/download.
328. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
329. See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 385 (3d Cir. 2011).
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meet its Step Two burden by arguing not simply that its policy yields
better tenants, but that abandoning it would also increase segregation
in its complex.330 Of course, the Step Two burden requires proof that
the challenged practice is necessary to achieve a substantial interest of
the defendant,331 which would not be met if this integrative-effect was
merely an unintended by-product of the defendant’s policy. While
housing providers may be under an obligation not to enhance segregation—and thus avoiding segregation-enhancing behavior that might
prompt litigation could qualify as a substantial interest332—it seems
unlikely that a landlord could reasonably argue that it adopted a “No
Criminal Record” policy for any reason other than to screen out undesirable tenants. Still, the only landlords that could make this argument
would be those that have already rented to substantial numbers of minorities, which at least suggests that an impact claim against them
would not accomplish the goal of rooting out unintended bias.333
Some defendant-municipalities that opposed a group home for
disabled persons because of its proximity to another such home have
tried this argument. Ever since the FHA was amended in 1988 to outlaw disability discrimination, a major portion of FHA-disability litigation has involved claims against local governments for blocking group
homes.334 A number of these claims have challenged “spacing requirements” that forbid operation of a group home closer than a certain
minimum distance from another such facility.335 In some of these
cases, the defendants have tried to justify these spacing requirements
as a way of dispersing housing for disabled persons. Courts have generally been skeptical, usually viewing spacing requirements as facially
discriminatory (thus reflecting intentional discrimination), therefore
resulting in FHA liability unless justified “by the unique and specific
330. Minorities are more likely to have a prior criminal record than whites. See
Schwemm & Bradford, supra note 6, at 741–42 (surveying literature showing that
U.S. incarceration rates are much higher for minorities than whites).
331. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,470–73
(Feb. 15, 2013) (discussing a defendant’s Step Two burden).
332. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583–85 (2009) (holding that an employer
faced with a Title VII disparate-impact claim with a strong basis in evidence may take
pro-integration action to avoid liability).
333. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (noting that one of the roles of the FHA-impact theory is “to
counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit
stereotyping”).
334. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 11D:5.
335. See id. at § 11D:5 n.15 (collecting cases).
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needs and abilities” of people with disabilities.336 Because these defendants were often seen as using the anti-segregation argument as a
pretext to mask weaker and less appealing justifications, this defense
has almost always failed.337 But there is an exception—the Eighth
Circuit’s 1991 decision in Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St.
Paul 338—which held that “the government’s interest in deinstitutionalization sufficiently rebutted any discriminatory effect of the [challenged spacing-requirement] laws.”339

336. Larkin v. Mich. Dep’t of Social Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1996)); accord
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1503–05 (10th Cir. 1995); Nev. Fair
Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Clark County, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182–87 (D. Nev. 2008);
Children’s All. v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491, 1496–98 (W.D. Wash. 1997);
Arc of N.J., Inc. v. New Jersey, 950 F. Supp. 637, 644–46 (D.N.J. 1996); Ass’n for
Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614,
621–25 (D.N.J. 1994).
337. See, e.g., Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290–92; Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc.
v. City of Greenfield, 23 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954–55 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Children’s All.,
950 F. Supp. at 1499; Arc of N.J., 950 F. Supp. at 645–46; Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 697–98
(E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting anticlustering justification in the course of ruling in favor of group home’s reasonableaccommodation challenge to defendant’s spacing requirement); United States v. City
of Chicago Heights, 161 F. Supp. 2d 819, 837–39 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same); United
States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (ruling in favor of
group home’s reasonable-accommodation challenge to defendant’s spacing requirement); K Care, Inc. v. Town of Lac du Flambeau, 510 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (same); cf. City of Peekskill v. Rehabilitation Support Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp.
1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (opining that “[p]reventing housing for disabled people
on the grounds that the City has already provided its fair share [of housing for mentally disabled people] . . . comes perilously close to violating the Fair Housing Act”).
338. 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
339. Id. at 94; see also Harding v. City of Toledo, 433 F. Supp. 2d 867, 872 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) (finding, in the course of rejecting group home’s motion for a preliminary
injunction against defendant-city’s spacing requirement, that the challenged buffer
zone here was significantly less burdensome than in cases that struck down such requirements); Avalon Residential Care Homes, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 130 F. Supp. 2d
833, 839–42 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (awarding summary judgment against both intent and
impact claims challenging city’s spacing requirement, although finding material fact
issues with respect to plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim).
However, most courts, differing with Familystyle, have viewed spacing-requirements as facially discriminatory, see supra note 336 and accompanying text, and thus
not “neutral” policies that may be challenged under the disparate-impact theory, see,
e.g., Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503–05; Oconomowoc Residential Programs, 23 F. Supp.
2d at 955; Children’s All., 950 F. Supp. at 1495. If spacing requirements are indeed
best viewed as intentionally discriminatory, then, according to HUD’s effect regulation, a defendant could not use an anti-segregation justification to prevail in such a
case. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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Familystyle is now seen as somewhat of an outlier in FHA group
home litigation.340 However, it suggests that some uncertainty does
exist as to whether defendants can satisfy their Step Two burden in an
impact case via an anti-segregation showing. Of course, even if a defendant does succeed in Step Two, the plaintiff may still prevail in
Step Three by showing that this anti-segregation goal could be
achieved by a less discriminatory alternative.341
b. Step Three Considerations
Step Three of a FHA discriminatory-effect case allows a plaintiff
to prevail, even if the defendant has established a legitimate justification for its effect-producing action, by proving that a less discriminatory alternative would also serve the defendant’s interest.342 This is an
easily understood concept in a disparate-impact case where, say, a
landlord’s screening device (e.g., a “No Criminal Record” policy)
could be modified to exclude fewer protected-class members (e.g., by
a “No Recent Felony Conviction” policy). But what would Step Three
look like when the plaintiff’s prima facie case is based solely on evidence that the defendant’s challenged action perpetuates segregation?
Few such cases have progressed to the stage where the defendant successfully justified its segregation-producing action, which, in turn,
means that courts have had little experience evaluating the plaintiff’s
Step Three burden of proving a “less segregative alternative.”343

340. See SCHWEMM, supra note 18, at § 11D:5 n.15.
341. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In one spacing-requirement case, the
court not only ruled against the defendant’s anti-segregation justification, but went on
to hold that even if this “avoidance of clustering” or “integration” justification was
legitimate, “there are less discriminatory ways to accomplish it.” Horizon House, 804
F. Supp. at 698.
342. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016)
(discussed supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text); Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F.
App’x 42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussed supra note 141 and accompanying text); Dews
v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (discussed supra note
84 and accompanying text); Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. 683 (discussed supra note
337 and accompanying text); see also Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga
Springs, 805 F.3d. 34, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding jury’s determination that
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of race-based segregative effect, albeit ruling
for the defendant on this claim presumably after finding that defendant’s justifications
were legitimate; supra notes 106–116 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson);
cf. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 69–70 (D. Mass. 2002)
(holding, after ruling inadequate defendants’ proffered justification for their residency
preferences challenged here on disparate-impact grounds, that plaintiffs’ suggested
alternatives were sufficient to prevail in Step Three even if defendants had met their
Step Two burden).

2017]

FHA SEGREGATIVE-EFFECT CLAIMS

771

The most common type of segregative-effect case has involved a
municipal-defendant’s blocking of a proposed affordable housing project, with the defendant pointing to traditional zoning concerns (e.g.,
increased traffic or demands on municipal services) to justify its action. To the extent such concerns are shown to be legitimate, they
could presumably be reduced by modifying the proposed development
(e.g., by limiting residents’ ability to have cars or providing recreational facilities on the grounds).
Courts considering Step Three in FHA disparate-impact cases
have looked with favor on modifications of the policy at issue.344
Note, however, that these were suggested modifications to the defendant’s challenged policy—which is what Step Three calls for—and
not to the plaintiff’s proposed housing. Still, this concept could be
adapted to the typical segregative-effect case by suggesting that, instead of blocking the plaintiff’s proposal, the defendant approve it but
with conditions that meet the latter’s legitimate concerns. This would
work in most exclusionary zoning cases.
But the more general problem remains. Given that the segregative-effect theory can be used to challenge single actions as well as
policies,345 there may be cases in which it is harder to envision how a
plaintiff can prevail in Step Three when the litigation’s only real goal
is to overturn the defendant’s action rather than to modify it.
CONCLUSION
The Fair Housing Act’s segregative-effect theory provides an additional way of curbing arbitrary barriers to integrated housing that
thwart the FHA’s core mission. Like FHA disparate-impact claims,
the segregative-effect theory does not require a showing of illegal intent and dates back to appellate decisions from the 1970s. Now bolstered by a 2013 HUD regulation, both segregative-effect and
disparate-impact claims are subject to the same three-step burdenshifting scheme, with the plaintiff first having to prove that the defendant’s challenged practice causes a discriminatory effect. The segregative-effect theory, however, has received substantially less attention
that its disparate-impact counterpart.
This Article provides guidance for evaluating FHA segregativeeffect claims. This theory is based primarily on cases challenging municipal land-use restrictions on affordable housing projects. These
“heartland” cases, which continue to generate a substantial amount of
344. See, e.g., Langlois, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 70; Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 698.
345. See supra Section II.A.1.
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litigation, establish the necessary elements of a segregative-effect
claim. Because these elements and the statistical proof necessary to
support them may be easier to prove than in a disparate-impact case
and also because segregative-effect claims may challenge one-time
decisions as well as general policies, this theory may succeed in certain types of exclusionary zoning cases where a disparate-impact
claim would not.
The segregative-effect theory may also apply in a variety of other
situations. These include cases involving local-resident preferences in
communities with few minorities and racial steering by private housing providers. Further, the theory applies not just to race and national
origin cases, but to all FHA-prohibited bases of discrimination; one
example would be claims by group homes for disabled persons, and
the theory may support some religion-based claims as well.
This Article has shown how FHA segregative-effect claims differ
from those under the disparate-impact theory and how they may make
a unique contribution to FHA law. The main focus has been the proof
necessary in the crucial Step One or “prima facie case” stage of a
segregative-effect case, but the Article also shows that key differences
in Steps Two and Three may occur in these two types of FHA-effect
cases.
The guidance provided here is offered with the understanding
that the FHA’s segregative-effect theory is still a work in progress,
with more judicial attention and standard-setting needed. This is particularly true with respect to the “how much” issue, i.e., how much a
defendant’s challenged action must be shown to add to segregation
before this theory will require a defendant to provide a justification for
that action. This is a crucial issue in all FHA-effect cases, whose main
contribution is likely to be the mandate that practices that curb housing opportunities for minorities require a substantial justification.
Thus, the Article’s ultimate conclusion is that, while the segregativeeffect theory holds great promise for advancing the FHA’s inclusion
goals, it needs more refinement before that promise can be fulfilled.

